Oberlin

Digital Commons at Oberlin
Honors Papers

Student Work

2010

What Makes a Belief Warranted? A Pragmatist’s Answer
Luke Herrine
Oberlin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Repository Citation
Herrine, Luke, "What Makes a Belief Warranted? A Pragmatist’s Answer" (2010). Honors Papers. 380.
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/380

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu.

What Makes a Belief Warranted?
A Pragmatist’s Answer
Luke Herrine
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INTRODUCTION
It is natural to think that some things are better to believe than others. It is equally natural
to think that we should believe the good beliefs and not the bad. In our everyday lives, we rarely
have any trouble distinguishing the former from the latter. One important question to ask,
though, is what makes good beliefs good and bad beliefs bad. Epistemologists have long tried to
find a principled distinction between good and bad beliefs. I think, though, that most
epistemologists have gone about finding such a distinctions in the wrong way.
Attempts to answer the question of what makes good beliefs good have generally come
out in theories of warrant and justification. These terms are often used interchangeably and their
definition can vary from author to author, so it will help to say how I shall deploy them. I will
use ‘warranted’ to mean epistemically good—that is, something we should believe—and I will
use ‘justified’ to mean supported by an appropriate bit of reasoning. Thus, all justified beliefs are
warranted but it is at least arguable that not all warranted beliefs are justified.
We can accordingly rephrase the question of what makes good beliefs good as what
makes a belief warranted. Some epistemologists may have proposed their theories of warrant
without the former question in mind, however. They may have seen themselves as performing a
conceptual analysis of the concept of warrant or of looking for the missing piece to Gettier’s
puzzle about knowledge and true belief. Though I think that either of these goals should be seen
as merely instrumentally useful in service of discovering what makes something good to believe,
I do not want to pick that fight here. I shall simply take from theories of warrant what is relevant
to creating a principled distinction between good and bad beliefs.
It has long been thought that the prime example of something we should believe is
something we know. Since Plato, justification has been commonly thought to be the essential
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quality that a belief must have in addition to truth in order to be considered knowledge.i As such,
for much of epistemology’s history, reflections on the nature of justification have focused on
how it underscores knowledge attributions. After Gettier’s famous essayii challenging established
thinking on justification’s role in knowledge attributions, the focus on the relationship between
knowledge and justification became all the more intense. The notion of warrant as something
slightly different than justification arose in this flurry of responses to Gettier’s challenges. Many
epistemologists continue to analyze reasons for accepting a belief in terms of that belief’s
relationship to knowledge. But, as exemplified in work by Timothy Williamson,iii dividing
knowledge up into constituent parts has fallen out of favor with many others.
Even after setting such conceptual analysis aside, it remains important to try to
understand what it takes for a belief to be warranted. On the one hand, Williamson argued for a
cessation to the breaking of knowledge into component parts because he wanted to focus our
attention on knowledge as a primitive concept. His position affirms even more strongly a
reliance on knowledge in figuring out what we should believe. 1 My position will follow his lead
in cleaving warrant from knowledge, but I will do so to attempt to find a more fruitful
explanation of the former rather than the latter. I think it is much more intuitive and certainly
more practically useful to ask questions about the nature of what we should believe than to ask
questions about the nature of knowledge. My reasons for this position should become more
evident as we move forward, so I do not wish to belabor it now.
Another historically relevant bugaboo attached to the concepts of warrant and
justification is certainty. Mathematically inclined thinkers from Descartes to Russell have
suggested that our only warranted beliefs are those of which we are certain. Contemporary
1

In Williamson’s “knowledge-first approach”, we must know what to call knowledge in order to know which
beliefs have warrant. One’s beliefs gain their warrant in virtue of evidential relations with one’s knowledge. I think
his view is unsatisfactory for some reasons that will come out below.

Herrine 4
philosophers find little attraction to this view, so I will simply treat it as defunct. Rather than
asking of what can we be certain, the more tractable question seems to be: what quality of a
belief makes it fit our standards? Phrased another way: what makes some things
reasonable/rational to believe and some things not? Many attempts have been made to answer
this question. I will explore internalism in its foundationalist and coherentist guises, externalism
in the forms of reliabilism and Plantingan proper functionalism, and the evidentialism explicated
by Conee and Feldman (with a nod to Williamson).2
Though all of these views have much to praise, my focus will be on the problems that
each faces. The sorts of problems I will point to will dig up an underlying issue common to all of
these approaches. Briefly stated, epistemologists have generally ignored the issue of warrant
attribution. Though epistemologists have had many interesting things to say concerning what
about a belief or a believer affects warrant they have had little to say concerning what about the
attributor of warrant affects warrant. They have missed epistemological parallax, or so I will
argue.3
Confronting the problem of epistemological parallax will be the goal of my positive
account. Facing up to the possibility that facts about us factor into which beliefs we count as
warranted opens a can of worms. We will no longer be able to take for granted our own
epistemic intuitions as obvious facts about what makes some beliefs better than others. We
should not rely on any guarantee that everybody will share our intuitions or that our intuitions are
invariant. I will explore in some depth what goes into the process of warrant attribution while
2

Conee and Feldman defend an internalist version of evidentialism and Williamson an externalist version. I treat
Conee and Feldman’s views apart from other internalist views because of important differences that I will address
later.
3
The recent popularity of contextualism about knowledge has made epistemologists more aware of these factors. I
will not address contextualism head on here, mostly because it deals with knowledge attributions and not warrant
attributions. It may be worth noting, though, that my position is much more closely aligned with the contextualism
of Michael Williams than that of Keith DeRose.
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taking into account both attributor and believer factors without taking for granted attributor’s
intuitions or relying on their invariance. My exploration will result in a sort of pragmatism:
pragmatism about warrant.
Various thinkers have anticipated several of the explanations I shall propose. I borrow
liberally. My purpose is most often to borrow concepts and glean inspiration rather than to
critically engage with a work or an oeuvre, so I will ask readers to excuse what may occasionally
seem idiosyncratic readings. Additionally, a few of the thinkers I reference will be unfamiliar to
or unpopular with contemporary analytic philosophers. I do my best to extract only the relevant
parts of these works and to make them comprehensible. Unfortunately, my views may seem
strange due to this borrowing, but I hope I can do the appropriate work to make them at least
defensible. In this vein, I follow up my positive account with a discussion of how I think it solves
the problems that I posed for other views and with responses to objections. I will conclude with a
discussion of the implications of acceptance of my proposal. Like some pragmatists before me, I
will suggest that epistemology should look decidedly different. But first, I want to explore how it
looks now.
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TRADITIONAL INTERNALISM
Internalism has been the dominant (often thought the only) epistemological position for
most of the history of epistemology since Descartes. A distinguishing feature of this view is the
identification of warrant and justification: the internalist focuses on how beliefs fit together
within a given subject’s doxastic architecture. In order to understand why a given belief has
warrant, the internalist would say, one must see how it fits with other beliefs held by the believer.
One must understand what reasoning the believer possesses for a questionable belief in order to
evaluate it. Internalism often goes hand-in-hand with what Michael Williams has called
epistemological realism. He uses this term to indicate the position that there exists some single
mostly-invariant epistemic structure to our beliefs, which we uncover when we engage in their
justification. So a belief gains its warrant from underlying justificatory connections with other
beliefs. When engaging in the defense of a given belief of ours, we must merely unveil our preexistent justificatory structure to demonstrate its warrant. Because the structure itself provides
the belief in question with its warrant, warrant and justification prove indistinguishable.4, iv
By far the most widely accepted (both historically and contemporaneously) internalist
position is foundationalism, which posits a certain set of basic beliefs that act as ultimate
justifiers to any non-basic belief within a person’s belief system. So the warrant of any given
belief derives from its relationship to beliefs more basic to it on down until the basic beliefs.
Basic beliefs enjoy the privileged status of needing no other belief to justify them. Various
possible reasons have been proposed for their special status, but I will not address them here.v

4

Basic beliefs might be warranted without being justified according to the internalist foundationalist. How this
works without some sort of externalism would be difficult to say. Foundationalists in the first half of the 20th century
struggled mightily with this problem. For a review (and a critique) see Williams’s Groundless Belief.
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Most modern-day internalist foundationalists (for brevity, I shall omit “internalist” for the
remainder of this section) hold the empiricist position that basic beliefs gain their warrant from
the fact that they derive from faculties that we justifiably trust. In fact, many contemporary
foundationalists use a bit of externalism to get at the warrant of basic beliefs, but for now we
shall leave this notion unquestioned.vi It will not be important to get into these details for the sort
of critique in which I want to engage.
Foundationalism lends itself especially well to structural metaphors for belief systems.
The position’s name itself leads the way: basic beliefs serve as the foundation upon which one
builds the rest of one’s doxastic structure.5 The stability of any given belief depends on the other
beliefs that support it, which ultimately depend on the stability of the foundation of basic beliefs.
Though we have beliefs about a wide range of topics that may not be directly connected to each
other, all of them are ultimately built upon this foundation. If the warrant of some belief comes
into question, all we must do is demonstrate the stability with which we have built the doxastic
structure that supports it. If challenges persist, we can always eventually find ourselves at our
foundational beliefs, which rest on undeniably solid ground.
The other commonly accepted internalist position is (the internalist version of)
coherentism. Coherentists might be described as having absorbed the Quinean insight that no
belief faces the tribunal of experience singularly but only as part of an entire belief system.vii As
such, the warrant of a given belief derives not from its relationship to some subset of basic
beliefs that have a special relationship with experience or the external world, bur rather from its
relationship to a believer’s whole doxastic structure. As long as the justificatory relations that
bond beliefs together are good, any given belief is good. Though no agreed-upon complete list
5

Sosa’s metaphor of a pyramid in “The Raft and the Pyramid” seems to me misleading, because it makes the
foundation the broadest part and it has only one apex. Not that these issues lead to any particular problems with his
analysis.
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exists, belief-bonding material is commonly thought to be made of such things as logical
entailment, Bayesian probability relations, explanatory relations, etc.viii There is no such thing as
modifying just one belief, because every belief is bonded to a whole set of other beliefs (and,
depending how thorough the holism, to every other belief) through such relations. Thus,
whenever it seems that just one belief is under review, actually a whole group of beliefs and their
relationships face rejection. The crucial factor in determining warrant/justification is how beliefs
cohere with each other rather than on what they are based.
The coherentist picture of beliefs resembles a web (or a raft, according to Sosa). Beliefs
are held together by justificatory threads. Knock off one belief and a whole series of others fall
with it. A section of beliefs can be repaired, but never just one. Justification is nonlinear—beliefs can be mutually supporting without being viciously circular. Just as a spiderweb
depends for its support on outside structures on which it can stick (the crook of a tree or the
corner of a doorjamb, for instance), a belief system depends on the outside influence of
experience for its support. However, not just the beliefs at the outer edge of the web are affected
by experience. “A conflict at the periphery occasions readjustments at the interior” of the web,
Quine saidix (though I quote him in support of this position, Quine should probably not be
considerd an internalist coherentist). The problem may not be with the peripheral beliefs, but
with their relationships to interior beliefs.
Both of these internalist positions have plenty of prima facie appeal, especially, I
suppose, because of their usage of metaphor. Visual animals and metaphorical thinkers that we
are, such theories draw us in.x But why they are intuitively appealing is incidental to the present
discussion—a topic for experimental philosophy, perhaps. In any case, they certainly have other
redeeming features. More incumbent on our pursuit of the best theory of warrant is why we
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should not adopt either internalist position. Of course the foundationalist and the coherentist each
has her reasons for rejecting the other’s position, but these will not concern us. The bigger
problem lies with the more encompassing commitment to internalism.
Recall that we are viewing internalism as an analysis of the principled difference between
good and bad beliefs. To do this explanatory work, both the coherentist and the foundationalist
appealed to global features of individuals’ doxastic structures. But why should we assume that
all beliefs gain warrant by the same means? Certainly that would make things easy for us
theoreticians—we would just have to figure out the rules for good beliefs and then apply them
whenever a specific case of questionable belief came up. Such a position makes especial sense if
one thinks about it in the context of the enlightenment in which it was developed: reason was
supposed to be able to solve everything, the unitary self (soul) was widely accepted, and
metaphysical systems were common ways of explaining each individual fact or belief. But
nowadays things do not seem quite as simple or easy as our philosophical predecessors may have
hoped. Scientists’ way of approaching things certainly seems quite different from that of
historians or art critics or monks, and even within science, molecular biologists do not go about
obtaining beliefs in quite the same way as physicists or economists. We go about things
differently depending on what we want to explain or whether explaining is our goal at all. Even
if all of these methodologies were merely different decorations for a more basic unitary structure
of beliefs, we would need to understand why it looks so different in these distinct dresses.
Moreover, that such a unitary standard exists should be a result and not a starting point in
explaining how warrant works. “All we know for sure is that we have various practices of
assessment [of warrant], perhaps sharing certain formal features; it doesn’t follow from this that
the various items given a positive rating add up to anything like a natural kind.”xi Much more
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work would need to be done to find or argue for such a unitary standard, and this work would
need to be done before internalist answers to why we should believe some things rather than
others would have any explanatory force.
As already mentioned, internalism also conflates justification with warrant. When asked
"what is it for a belief to be warranted?" the internalist hears "how do we justify a belief?" and in
the same action assumes that what comes to light in justifying behavior is what underlies a
belief’s being warranted in the first place. Not that this is an unreasonable first move. When we
ask ourselves the question of what we should believe, of what makes a belief warranted, an
obvious first place to look for answers is how we defend our beliefs. The problem arises when
we take these defenses to be exercises in introspection.6 Belief defense depends as much on
one’s concept of one’s audience as one’s concept of one’s own beliefs. When we engage in
justification, we aim to absolve ourselves of epistemic blame. Doing so might have little to do
with reflecting on our own belief-gaining mechanisms. One would be ineffective in defending
her belief if she did not take into account the standards of the challenger.
The confusion between warrant and justification may also have arisen because if I say
"belief S is justified" outside of any specific context then it is unclear whether I mean "belief S
was questioned by X and appropriately defended by Y" or "X’s belief S is warranted ". In other
words, outside of any context it is unclear whether the participial form "justified" is the passive
perfect form of the verb "justify" or merely functioning as an adjective—whether it means "well
defended" or "warranted". But no matter why the conflation arises, it is important to note that it
is a conflation. Given the above considerations, we seem to have little reason to think that these

6

And making such a move moves one to Bonjour’s absurd invocation of the “doxastic presumption” in his defenses
of coherentism (op. cit.). His own (later) reasons to reject this principle are perhaps the most damning. They can be
found in Laurence BonJour, “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism” in The Blackwell Guide to
Epistemology ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1998): 126-130
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two possible parsings of the term “justified” reflect the same underlying phenomenon. The great
majority of the time, our beliefs are taken as warranted without having to be justified (i.e.
defended), and how they are justified may have little to do with their warrant.
Internalism’s most glaring and most discussed problems is its uncomfortable relationship
with skepticism. The very invocation of a foundation or a global coherence in the first place can
be instructively conceptualized as a response to Agrippan skepticism. To briefly summarize, the
Agrippan skeptic worries that once we confront a particularly pesky challenger (imagine a 3year-old, for instance, repeatedly asking "why?"), we face one of three seemingly unsatisfactory
options, known as Agrippa's Trilemma. First, we could be unable to find any stopping point for
justification whatsoever and continue ad infinitum nauseamve with no satisfactory response for
the challenger. Second, we might use some circular reasoning; i.e. we might use a belief for
justification that has already been challenged. Third, we might arbitrarily choose one belief at
which to cease justifying. The foundationalist might be thought to have discovered a fourth,
more palatable option: we end justification on a basic belief. Because these basic beliefs have
privileged status, it would not be arbitrary to end on them--they just are the foundation upon
which all of our beliefs rest.
But what if these foundational beliefs are not as immune to challenge as the
foundationalist thinks? The Cartesian skeptic, for instance, has been thought to call into question
the certainty (or, in a more powerful modification, the legitimacy) of foundational beliefs. If the
foundationalist cannot fend off these attacks, then she finds herself in dire straits indeed, for she
has built her epistemological edifice so that if the foundation is unstable, then the whole structure
falls. Because the foundationalist must presuppose that all beliefs depend for their justification
on basic beliefs, she must maintain that unjustified basic beliefs would render every belief
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unjustified. It is in the foundationalist's best interest to fend off the Cartesian skeptic, because if
the skeptic is not refuted head-on, then the foundationalist must concede that none of our beliefs
are justified by her standards.
Unfortunately for foundationalism, nobody has been able to find a good direct
counterargument to the skeptic. Even Kant, who called it “a scandal of philosophy” that the
existence of the outside world had not yet been proven by philosophers,xii failed to provide a
generally accepted knock-down counterattack to the skeptic. Indeed, much of the history of
modern epistemology has resembled Reagan-era discretionary spending in that an enormous
amount of resources have been devoted to defending our beliefs from the impending doom
threatened by the apparent arsenal of the looming skeptical enemy. Yet still no foolproof defense
has been worked out.xiii The problem is that if we think that internalist foundationalism explains
what makes our beliefs justified, we would need a foolproof defense from the skeptic to be able
to have any justified beliefs.
The coherentist provides a different response to the Agrippan skeptic. Rather than
focusing on a special class of beliefs, we should end the regress by understanding why circular
reasoning can be virtuous. We should jettison questions of regress in favor of seeing the trees for
the forest. But this response confronts another sort of skepticism, which can be stated quite
simply. Even if all of our beliefs cohere perfectly well, they could have nothing to do with the
real/external world. Because we want our beliefs to correspond to, or at least be accurate
descriptions of, the external world, coherence does not seem to be enough of a criterion for
warrant. A totally deluded person can have perfectly coherent beliefs without having any
accurate beliefs.7

7

See also Plantinga’s case of the hiker with a frozen visual field in Warrant and Proper Function, 179.
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Both internalist positions prove especially weak against skepticism because of two basic
features of the versions of internalism explored here. The first is the appeal to global features of
an individual’s belief system. Skepticism exploits the reliance on a single set of factors for the
warrant of all beliefs by calling into question the legitimacy of those very factors. If the warrant
of any given belief depends on very general features of one’s doxastic structure, then challenges
to the general features call all specific beliefs into question. For the foundationalist, questioning
the legitimacy of basic beliefs leads to potential problems with all beliefs. For the coherentist,
pointing out that perfectly coherent belief systems can be wildly inaccurate potentially
problematizes all of our beliefs. Of course it is also damning that these global features describe
the internal structure of beliefs, because both Cartesian skepticism and anti-coherentist
skepticism challenge the metaphysical relationship between the internal and the external world,
where the former is supposed to represent the latter. If we have no mechanism of knowing
whether the internal is in touch with the external, then it remains an open possibility that even the
beliefs best justified by internalist lights in fact have no relation to external reality.
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EXTERNALISM
Dissatisfied with the inadequacies of internalism, various authors have developed
theories of warrant that they call, contrariwise, “externalism”. To answer the question of what
makes something good to believe, externalists move the focus away from how an agent’s beliefs
fit together (though they may have some independent interest in those issues) and use various
objective facts about the believer in relation to an environment to determine the warrant of a
belief. They propose that "warranted" be seen as an evaluative term in epistemological discourse,
like "good" in moral discourse. In each case we evaluate a human action according to the
standards of a given discourse or set of discourses. While internalists had asked how something
is justified, an externalist thinks that the focus should turn to why something is, in actual fact,
warranted. In order to do so, we are directed to look at beliefs that we think are well formed and
then figure out what they have in common that renders them thus.
Reliabilism is the most enduring externalist theory. It hones in on the manner in which
beliefs were formed. Reliabilists hold that if a belief arises from a reliable belief-forming
process, then it is warranted. For a belief-forming process to be reliable, it must be the sort that
mostly produces true beliefs with the given inputs. Which belief-forming processes are reliable
are said to be vaguely delimited to reflect our messy everyday attributions of warrant. Some
belief-forming processes produce true beliefs nearly always while some just do so more often
than not. The former should certainly be considered reliable while the status of the latter may be
up for debate. To a similar end, reliability is posited to be a matter of degree—some beliefforming processes are more reliable than others without any bright line separating which
engenders warrant and which does not. Thus, seeing a pie in the window from a foot away with
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normal 20/20 vision is more reliable than seeing a pie in the window from 30 feet away, which is
more reliable than seeing a pie in the window from 200 feet away. At some (vaguely established)
distance, 20/20 vision is no longer reliable, and, as such, a belief produced from this faculty no
longer has any warrant.xiv
Reliabilism maintains a foundationalist flavor, as it designates a certain set of
immediately warranted beliefs that provide the basis for the warrant of the rest. Immediately
warranted beliefs arise from belief-independent processes (i.e. they are not generated from other
beliefs—perception and memory work this way) while mediately warranted beliefs arise from
belief-dependent processes (i.e. they are based on other beliefs). A belief-dependent belief can
only be called warranted if the belief-independent beliefs on which it depends and the cognitive
operations that led the subject from these beliefs to the belief-dependent belief are reliable.
However, this warrant-bestowing process does not depend solely on the present state of the
subject’s doxastic architecture, as the internalist foundationalist would have it, but rather on the
diachronic ontogenesis of any given belief. The process is what is important, not the believer’s
state of mind.
Alvin Plantinga has offered another version of externalism. On his account, “a belief has
warrant if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a cognitive environment
congenial for these faculties, according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth”.xv If any
aspect of this formulation fails to apply, then the belief does not count as warranted. The details
of this formulation could take up a book—and have done so—so my account will be necessarily
abbreviated, but the general idea is as follows. Some of our cognitive faculties have been
designed (by God, evolution, or whatever) to provide us true beliefs in a given set of
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circumstances. These beliefs count as functioning properly when they behave according to the
truth-directed design plan.
To get at what Plantinga has in mind here, it helps to compare a human to a car. A car is
designed to transport cargo over certain types of surface by means of a combustion engine. If the
alternator fails and the car cannot run, then it is not functioning properly—it does not accomplish
the goal for which it was designed. If the car fails to transport cargo across a mile of quicksand,
then it should not be said to be functioning improperly, but rather functioning properly in an
environment not congenial to its design. If an engineer designs a car to make its cargo explode
rather than transport it, the car is functioning properly when it does explode the cargo, but it
functions according to a design plan not aimed at transporting cargo, the proper aim of a car.
Similarly, some of our faculties have been designed to produce true beliefs8, and these beliefs
count as warranted if they function the way they are supposed to in the sort of environment in
which they are supposed to function well.
Externalism—in the two leading forms discussed here, but also more generally—has a
general procedure for uncovering what make something good to believe. First, the externalist
finds methods of belief acquisition that she trusts/epistemically values. Putting it this way is a bit
unfair to the externalist, because the epistemically valuable beliefs are not supposed to be
idiosyncratic to the particular externalist in question, but rather indicative of what any reasonable
person would value. The way such beliefs are usually delimited is by tacitly appealing to the
commonsense of the reader: “look, here is an obvious case of a warranted belief”. The possibility
that one could think otherwise does not even come into play. In any case, the general idea is to
find types of belief that have epistemic value (though for whom goes unmentioned). After
8

Some cognitive faculties might be said to have been designed for two sorts of things, exhibiting functional
multiplicity, but it is only the part of the cognitive faculty’s design that points towards truth that matters to
epistemologists (ibid, 25).

Herrine 17
finding these beliefs, the externalist analyzes what about their methods of acquisition we value
with an eye for some shared valuable property. Generally this has been done by showing that the
valued methods lead to true beliefs in the appropriate conditions and then detailing the specifics
of the methods’ means of producing true beliefs.9
It is the first step with which I want to take issue here. I find the thought unavoidable that
in pointing out which beliefs we praise and which we criticize, all we are discovering is what our
epistemic preferences are. Not that this information has no value. But its value is not the
discovery of the best ways of going about things, it has at best discovered what our
commonsense intuitions tell us are the best ways of going about things. These facts have
importance insofar as they tell us about what sorts of epistemic judgments people who think like
us10 make. However it would be overly conservative and ethnocentric to think that we do the best
job making such judgments and thus that the nature of warrant can be discovered only in our
own epistemic evaluations. 11
One way to see the problem here clearly is by confronting the existence of cognitive
diversity. Stephen Stich expresses this confrontation especially clearly and urgently.xvi He notes
that the fact that we could reason quite differently paired with the fact that many other people
actually do so leads us to question whether we have any particularly good reason for doing it our
way. Because (at least many of) our cognitive processes come to us as part of our cultural
inheritance and others have different cultural inheritances, we should question whether the
cognitive processes that happened to be passed down to us are the best for doing the job we want

9

This procedure also goes for other forms of externalism not discussed here (Nozick’s and Armstrong’s, for
instance).
10
And who is “us”, here? I generally mean highly-educated western scientifically-minded 20th- and 21st-century
philosophers. In other words, those who have understood and been sympathetic to the works of externalist
epistemologists.
11
Goldman acknowledges the tacit ethnocentrism to some extent on p. 104 but he does not examine its implications.
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them to do. The externalist response might be that these different cognitive processes—however
they were inherited—can all be analyzed according to the same standards of warrant. We can
find out if they are the best for doing their job by testing them against standards of warrant. But
the standards of warrant that the externalist employs are merely those of her own culture’s
commonsense, and “surely the evaluative epistemic concepts embedded in everyday thought and
language are every bit as likely as the cognitive processes they evaluate to be culturally acquired
and to vary from culture to culture”.xvii In light of the evaluative diversity that surrounds us,
adopting standards that strike one as commonsensical seems a somewhat arbitrary move.
A possible externalist rebuttal might go something like this: “All I am saying is that we
want to adopt methods of belief acquisition that lead us to true beliefs. Even if another culture
goes about things differently, we can analyze its methods of belief acquisition in terms of how
well they produce true beliefs. Regardless of which culture a given epistemic practice comes
from, it can be evaluated in terms of its ability to lead its practitioners to true beliefs.”
Unfortunately, such a response only pushes the problem back a level. Different people have
different concepts of which beliefs are true. These differences can turn on quite deep
disagreements (such as the question of whether God exists or whether the earth is round) or those
more trivial (such as whether the concept of water includes XYZ in addition to H2O). Setting an
absolute standard based on only the set of beliefs that one currently thinks is true seems to turn
on the same arbitrariness as before.
To emphasize this point I think it is helpful to think about what people thought was true
over various periods of history rather than across present cultural boundaries. It is especially
helpful to think about the history of scientific discovery. In any scientific field what scientists
think is true changes relatively often and can at any given time be up for debate. Additionally,
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many sciences periodically change standards for what count as good lines of reasoning. If at any
point in the history of science, a scientist were to stop and say: “okay, now we have not only the
truth of the matter, but also the best way of evaluating whether or not we have gotten to the truth
of the matter”, we would say that that scientist was being overly epistemically conservative. To
see this, imagine if Carl Linnaeus had said such a thing, or Charles Darwin. Evaluating our own
relation to truth so positively in the present day would also seem to render us guilty of myopic
epistemic conservatism we would attribute to them. We should leave open the possibility that
both our cognitive processes and our methods of evaluation could improve, and not just in degree
but perhaps also in kind.
One possible way to make plausible the idea that we are doing the best possible job with
our epistemic evaluations is to argue that they do not merely come to us through cultural
inheritance, but that they do so with some special guarantee of their correctness. Alvin Plantinga
sees this situation quite clearly and uses it to argue for the conclusion that if one is an
epistemological naturalist (as he considers a proper functionalist to be), one must be a
metaphysical supernaturalist. His argument goes something like this.xviii Suppose there is no
divine being guaranteeing the proper function (or reliability) of our faculties. Suppose, that is,
that our methods of belief acquisition evolved in an environment much like that which modern
synthesis evolutionary biology suggests. In such an environment cognitive processes would be
selected for their survival value and not necessarily their truth-conduciveness (and thereby their
proper function and/or reliability). But having cognitive processes selected for their survival
value does not guarantee that they will produce true beliefs. In fact, given the wide set of
alternatives, there is a relatively low probability that they would produce true beliefs.12 The
12

Plantinga precisifies these arguments somewhat using Baysean theory, but I will ignore these details. For those
interested, they can be found in the chapter already cited.
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kicker, of course, is that because such improbably truth-producing cognitive faculties produced
the theory of evolution, this theory is highly unlikely to be true and thus indirectly self-defeating.
Plantinga’s way out of this sticky situation is merely to suggest that the theist has a guarantee
that her faculties are truth-producing, because she believes that God guided evolution to create
man in God’s image. Most epistemologists will want to avoid this conclusion for independent
reasons, though. I would suggest that one could successfully avoid it by leaving externalism’s
epistemic conservatism behind. If one does this then one does not have to be worried that
evolution is unlikely to have produced true beliefs because one is not necessarily concerned
about which beliefs are true. Along with Stich, from whom Plantinga ironically borrows in
making his argument for supernaturalism, one could merely be concerned about which beliefs
have instrumental value.xix
The externalist may have other recourse due to her theory’s residue of foundationalism.
The argument might go something like this. Basic beliefs gain their warrant just by the fact that
they come from cognitive faculties that we all trust—across times, cultures, languages, etc. They
produce beliefs that we can all think are true or at least that we can all agree on. Mediately
warranted beliefs gain their warrant by proper connection to basic beliefs. Unwarranted mediate
beliefs arise due to improper connections with basic beliefs or connections with unwarranted
basic beliefs. Since no issues with truth arise concerning basic beliefs and mediate beliefs depend
on proper connection to basic beliefs (and not necessarily on their teleological relationship with
truth), then problems with truth are avoided.
I doubt that this argument works. It seems that carving out properly basic beliefs relies on
the same arbitrariness as is involved in an appeal to truth, but even supposing the argument goes
through, the reliance on foundationalism is too much of a liability for externalism for this move
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to be worth it. The problem lies with the proposed asymmetry of basic beliefs and mediate
beliefs. To see this we must examine how basic beliefs gain their warrant a bit more carefully.
Such an examination will problematize foundationalism beyond just the externalist version.
For the externalist foundationalist, it is not adequate to proceed just because we’re not
violating any rule that we epistemologists have established (as seems to be the case for some
internalists); we must, in addition, have positive reason to think that basic beliefs are warranted.
Plantinga provides a positive reason indicative of the externalist viewpoint on basic beliefs (the
reliabilist picture would be slightly different, but, I think, prone to the same arguments that I
provide). According to him, a warranted belief is “produced by [properly functioning] cognitive
faculties according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth”.xx We must be doing more than
just avoiding epistemic violations in accepting basic beliefs: we must be on the path to truth, and
we must be traveling that path with cognitive faculties that work correctly. That is not to say that
we must know whether or not we are oriented towards truth, but rather that the faculties we are
using for producing the beliefs must be faculties that are designed to produce true beliefs. So, for
instance, our beliefs should not arise out of wishful thinking or sycophancy or spite.xxi
If a belief comes to one immediately and has warrant (because it came to one through a
properly functioning cognitive faculty etc.), then it is said to be a properly basic belief. The
basic-ness is proper because one is trusting faculties that one should be trusting. But just because
properly basic beliefs are acquired with warrant does not render them indefeasible. If we are
confronted with good reason to drop it, then it is our epistemic duty to do so. Take the case in
which I believe that I saw Pedro on the streets of Omaha yesterday. This belief derives from my
memory of having seen Pedro13, and as such is properly basic. However, if Pedro’s trustworthy
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As Plantinga points out, this memory need not necessarily be a replay of the sensual experience of seeing Pedro, it
could just be a ‘doxastic experience’ in which it just occurs to me that I did see Pedro yesterday.
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boyfriend Jeff tells me that Pedro was traveling in Moscow yesterday and that his twin was in
Omaha, I have a defeater for my belief that I saw Pedro yesterday. This does not mean that I was
originally unwarranted in trusting my memory, but it does pull the warrant out from under my
original belief so that it is no longer responsibly tenable.
Given their defeasibility, basic beliefs aren’t basic in the way that the traditional
foundationalist would conceive of them. Non-basic beliefs can defeat basic beliefs and vice
versa. Even more damagingly, though non-basic beliefs by definition cannot be evidential
supports of basic beliefs, they can support them. Specifically, which other beliefs I have can
affect which basic beliefs count as properly basic. The state of my noetic structure determines
how I form basic beliefs. If this is the case, it seems hard to hold onto externalism and
foundationalism simultaneously, for then it is hard to see how basic beliefs hold a special status
that avoids arbitrariness. To see that it is, let us examine examples.
Take the case where Alvin feels tired. He believes he is tired. His belief that he is tired is
warranted because Alvin’s proprioceptive capacities are in full working order and are telling him
that he is tired. The relevant further question is: how does feeling tired bring about the belief that
he is tired? It seems that in order to convert the feeling of tiredness into the belief that he is tired,
Alvin must be able to interpret the feeling he has as tiredness. The ability to believe that he is
tired based on his feeling of tiredness is, then, "an acquired causal characteristic" of Alvin, as
Sellars has convincingly argued.xxii Nothing special about tiredness—save its familiarity—makes
it a source of immediate justification. A very large set of beliefs can be properly basic if the
agent undergoes the correct training. Alvin was trained to associate his feeling of tiredness with
the term and concept “tired”, but he could conceivably be retrained to believe that whenever he
has the feeling he currently associates with tiredness, he is actually experiencing the pressure of a
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magnet placed in his head. Suppose, for instance, his doctor informs him of this fact after a series
of examinations. Then Alvin's belief that a magnet in his head has been activated would be
immediately justified by the feeling that he once associated with tiredness. This is just a
modification of Sellars's point that "observational knowledge of any particular fact...presupposes
that one knows general facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y”, which means that "one
couldn't have observational knowledge of any fact unless one knew many other things as
well".xxiii That is, the warrant of a basic belief depends on the warrant of many other beliefs.
But maybe only basic beliefs based on phenomenal experience work this way. Maybe the
warrant of beliefs based on doxastic experience (see footnote 13 above) are independent of the
warrant of other beliefs. This seems unlikely. Suppose Jeff asks Pedro what the first musical
instrument he learned to play was. Pedro, whose memory is working perfectly well, recalls that
he learned to play the oboe before any other instrument. The belief generated by this
memory—that the first instrument he played was the oboe—depends on the warrant of many
other beliefs of Pedro’s. For instance, he must believe that an oboe is a musical instrument and
that banging on pots and pans as a toddler does not count as learning to play a musical
instrument. To see this, imagine if Pedro had lacked either of these beliefs before Jeff asked him
about his creative genesis. If Pedro (unwarrantedly) believed that an oboe is not a musical
instrument, then he would (unwarrantedly) believe that he never learned to play a musical
instrument.
The important point here is that basic beliefs do not just arise from an experience through
some occult process. They arise from an experience given that the believer has a series of other
beliefs and has learned to associate certain experiences with certain beliefs. The association
involved here, is, of course, implicit—the believer does not have an experience and then dig
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through their catalog of beliefs to find the one that matches it—the belief is, rather, generated
habitually. Plantinga’s statement that the belief is “occasioned” by the experience remains true,
but now the occasioning is not so mysterious. And once the occasioning of a basic belief loses its
mystery, properly basic beliefs don’t seem so special and privileged. Sellars’s comment that
“empirical knowledge…is rational not because it has a foundation but because it is a selfcorrecting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”xxiv implies not
only that we should not look to basic beliefs as the special part of our noetic structure that makes
the whole rational14, but also that basic beliefs should be put to the same scrutiny as any other.
Which eliminates the asymmetry inherent to foundationalism,xxv and with it any potential
recourse to this asymmetry in defense of externalism.
Without any special reason to think that philosophers’ intuitive judgments about which of
our beliefs are epistemically valuable have some special insight, the externalist’s procedure has
little traction to move forward. I have suggested various reasons to think that philosophers’
intuitions do not have this special insight. If my arguments are successful, externalism is
seriously lacking as an analysis of the concept of warrant. We cannot simply assume that we
know what the good beliefs are and then analyze what they have in common to find out what
underlies a warranted belief. We must be aware that when we attribute warrant to a belief, we are
operating within some set of epistemic standards of value. In order to understand what goes into
some given attribution of warrant, we have to understand what about the attributor (an externalist
epistemologist, in this case) causes her to make such an attribution. Whereas externalists have
taken themselves to have discovered what the real standards of warrant are, they have only
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…and not just rational. Plantinga examines what makes a belief justified, rational, and warranted, with warranted
being the strongest claim about a belief. Because Sellars did not think in these terms, I think it’s fair to say that we
could replace ‘rational’ with ‘justified’ or ‘warranted’ or any related epistemic term of praise and still capture his
intentions.
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analyzed what the standards of warrant are for people like them in the situations that they have
investigated.
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EVIDENTIALISM
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman’s celebrated evidentialism is an updated version of
internalism that remedies some of the problems with more traditional forms. The basic assertion
of evidentialism is that a doxastic attitude towards a given proposition is warranted for a believer
if and only if having that doxastic attitude towards the proposition fits the evidence that the
believer has at the time of the belief. xxvi Conee and Feldman identify this position as internalism
because all of the factors involved in the warrant of a belief are internal to the believer.
Evidence, in their sense, can only be some mental state or series of mental states. However,
Conee and Feldman insert an important caveat to their internalism. They note that someone who
has evidence for something “need not know, or have good reason to believe” that they have that
evidence.xxvii It merely must be the case that somewhere in the believer’s cognitive system there
exists appropriate evidence for her belief. Another aspect of evidentialism that distances it from
traditional internalism is the evidentialist position that the believer’s reasoning for such a belief
is not the only thing that can count as evidence for it—any sort of mental state, from memory to
perception to heard testimony, will do.
Due to these adjustments, some of the major difficulties for traditional internalism fail to
stick to evidentialism. Whereas both traditional internalist positions had posited global properties
of belief, evidentialism need not take any position on doxastic architecture or what special
qualities of the whole render its parts warranted. One’s belief must merely fit the evidence that
one has for it—whether or not this evidence has global coherence or rests on a special set of
beliefs need not come into play. It also avoids the internalist requirement that a believer be aware
of the evidence for her belief in order for it to count as warranted. The believer must, in some
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sense, possess the evidence in question (it cannot be evidence that exists somewhere
unbeknownst to the believer),15 but the believer need not have “some internal representation of
this fact”xxviii to make that evidence relevant to the warrant of the belief. Just as importantly,
evidentialism does not restrict the moniker “evidence” to just beliefs. Perceptions, memories, and
testimony can all count as evidence for a belief. As long as the evidence is internal to the
believer—as long as the believer at some point has been aware of the evidence—then it can
count as a justifier/warrant-bestower for a belief. In short, evidentialism does not confuse
warrant with justification.
Evidentialism also sidesteps some worries about externalism. There is no clear way in
which evidentialism can be seen to rely on truth, with all its aforementioned difficulties. Indeed,
if one has good evidence for a belief, one can be said to be warranted in holding it even if it is
produced by an illusion.16 The belief need not be produced by a design plan aimed at truth or a
reliable belief-producing process; it only needs to have good evidence. Evidentialism can thus
maintain the normative aspect of externalism without falling prey to the difficulties of saying
what counts as true or a good design plan.
The problem with evidentialism arises when one asks what makes some bit of potential
evidence count as actual evidence. Or, to put it in Feldman’s terminology, what makes some bit
of evidence epistemically acceptable?xxix Take the case of Polly, the paranoid schizophrenic.
Conee and Feldman’s position quite clearly implies that her paranoid belief that the local
government has created a program to spy on her every move does not have sufficient
evidence.xxx But suppose she thinks it has evidence. She has a series of mental states she can
15

In the same volume, Richard Feldman argues for the view that the evidence must be present in the believer’s mind
at the time of the belief, but this is just one type of evidentialism. I will concern myself with the more general case
that takes no position on this issue.
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Conee and Feldman’s treatment of Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat scenario seems to imply this conclusion (op. cit., 6061)
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refer to that she thinks provide evidence for her belief that the government is spying on her. Why
does what she counts as evidence not count as evidence all told? We might say that she is not
responsive to defeaters or that the amount of evidence she has is not really enough to warrant the
belief that she is being spied on. Polly might think, though, that the government is just doing a
good job covering its tracks—what seem like defeaters are really contrivances and what seems
like insufficient evidence is just the most available given the cover-up.
In the evidentialist schema, we have a believer, a belief up for evaluation, and a series of
other mental states possessed by the believer. If the belief in question counts as warranted, then
the series of other mental states under consideration count as evidence for that belief. The
question that arises in the case of Polly, though, is when these mental states should be considered
evidence. If we don’t answer this question, then it will be difficult to pick out which of our
uncountable mental states should be considered in evaluating the evidential support for a belief.
Yet Conee and Feldman never point to principled criteria for selecting mental states. They rely
on our intuitions about how evidence and epistemic support work. The problem, though, is that
not everybody has the same intuitions about what counts as evidence for what. Indeed, our
judgments about what bits of potential evidence are epistemically acceptable may be situationdependent.
At this point Conee and Feldman might refer to a notion that they call wellfoundedness.xxxi For a belief of Polly’s to be well-founded it must be warranted based on the
body of evidence that she has and there must be no more inclusive body of evidence that she has
with which her belief would better fit. Conee and Feldman might say, “let us grant that Polly’s
belief is warranted according to the body of evidence she has in mind. Even if this is the case,
she has a more inclusive body of evidence that she should be using in evaluating the warrant of
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her belief.” One initial worry we might have about such a response revolves around the concept
of inclusiveness. What makes some body of evidence more inclusive than another? It would
seem hard to provide an answer to this question without reverting to the old-fashioned internalist
appeal to global features of beliefs. But let us leave that worry aside. Suppose, instead, that Polly
does not have a more inclusive body of evidence. In the case of a paranoid schizophrenic this is
not too hard to imagine: Polly may only have mental states that fit her paranoid belief. She may
never have entertained an alternative explanation for her experiences. It seems that her belief
would still count as well-founded according to the criteria set out by Conee and Feldman simply
because there is no more-inclusive body of evidence to appeal to in her case. What the
evidentialist might want to say here is that if Polly were in her right mind she would have a more
inclusive body of evidence. But making judgments about being in one’s right mind also involve
normative judgments about which cognitive processes are good. There is, then, still an
unexplained appeal to normative principles at issue.
What comes out in examining the case of Polly is that we have normative intuitions about
what count as good and bad evidence and that other people may not share these intuitions. We
are thus in a similar place as we were in looking at the normativity implicit in externalism. In
figuring out what counts as acceptable evidence, one must take into account who is doing the
epistemic evaluation. Polly would evaluate evidence of the government’s secretive surveillance
as acceptable evidence, while I would not. In any process of evidence evaluation, there is a
normative element implicit, and when a normative element comes into play we need to know
something about whose standards are being employed and why. Though the example at hand my
seem too absurd to matter, it seems clear that different normative positions on evidence exist
within those who think that religious experiences count as warranted and those who do not, and
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that these differences are epistemically, if not practically, important.17 Suppose Alvin just had a
deeply moving experience that he interpreted as a direct experience of God. He recounts his
experience to both Plantinga and Daniel Dennett. Plantinga will most likely interpret the content
of the experience as evidence (for Alvin) for the existence of God, while Dennett will most likely
deny that this experience should count as evidence for the existence of God. With whom one
agrees depends on the details, but the point is that evaluations of evidence should not be seen as
evaluator-independent. One must have a series of normative epistemic beliefs in order to engage
in any such evaluations.
Conee and Feldman take for granted that the examples they provide will elicit certain
epistemic evaluations. Like the externalist’s appeal to truth, however, this agreement on
evaluations may rely more on the shared cultural background of analytic epistemologists than
any inherent quality of the beliefs and situations in question. It certainly relies on shared
normative epistemic intuitions, and, as Stich has argued, we have no reason to think that these
intuitions have any special value merely because they are shared. Research by him and othersxxxii
seems to indicate that our epistemic intuitions are not shared by all people from all cultures.
Even apart from this research, we have no a priori reason to think that our evaluations are mostly
reliable and much a posteriori reason to think that they are not.xxxiii What we count as evidence
probably has more to do with contingent facts about how we were raised than necessary facts
about the intrinsic value of certain beliefs or certain relations between beliefs and other mental
states. 18
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See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. My response to Plantinga’s position can be found in “Making Sense of
the Sensus Divinitatis”, unpublished.
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Williamson’s knowledge-first approach might be considered an externalist form of evidentialism. For Williamson,
the warrant of beliefs is based on the evidence of all and only one’s knowledge. He understands knowledge as the
basic factive mental state (every factive mental state is also knowledge) and counts something as evidence if it
increases the probability of a given belief. Just as with Conee and Feldman, the evidential relations need not be
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known by the subject in order to count as evidence. One does not even have to know that one knows something in
order for it to count as knowledge.
Though I cannot discuss it in sufficient detail, it seems to me that Williamson’s approach is beset with the
difficulties of both evidentialism and externalism. Because knowledge is factive, in order for a belief to count as
knowledge it must be true (this does not imply that knowledge is a property of a belief, it just provides a convenient
way of talking about these issues). But again, how do we know if any given belief is true? Williamson might say that
whether or not we know that a given belief is true does not matter, for we do not need to know that we know a given
belief in order to know it simpliciter. There is a fact of the matter about whether or not we know something due to
its objective relation with truth, even though we may not have any cognitive access to this fact of the matter. The
warrant of a belief, then, depends on only things that one knows, whether or not one knows (or anyone else knows)
which of one’s beliefs actually count as knowledge. In other words, some of our beliefs have warrant and others do
not, but we may or may not know which.
I think that the cost of such a thoroughgoing externalism outweighs the benefits. The big cost is that we
don’t (necessarily) know which of our beliefs are warranted, which leaves us open to skepticism. Williamson’s
responses to skepticism are not enough to close this opening. He claims that the skeptic begs the question by
claiming that one cannot know if one is in a skeptical scenario in a non-skeptical scenario. The skeptic hopes to
prove that we cannot know if we are in a skeptical scenario in a non-skeptical scenario, but she simply assumes that
this is the case in going about proving it, or so Williamson thinks. He attempts to make the contrary palatable by
arguing that our evidence is different in the real world than in the skeptical scenario. The problem is that the sort of
evidence that Williamson has in mind is the type that we do not know if we have, so the skeptical challenge has
merely been temporarily pushed back. Even if not necessarily knowing which of our beliefs are warranted does not
leave us open to skepticism, it does put us in an unfortunate and puzzling situation. Recall that warrant is supposed
to be what we should believe, so on Williamson’s picture we are left saying that we do not know what we should
believe.
Perhaps we should not, on reflection, have any problem with not knowing what we should believe. Then
the difficulty then becomes how we should go about believing in our impoverished state. On a certain level our
epistemology must take pragmatic concerns into account, for we do continue believing things and we want to be
able to do so in the best way possible.
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EPISTEMIC FORMS OF LIFE
Although there are more positions on warrant and more variations thereon, I take it that
those I have addressed thus far cover most of the landscape. At the least, I take it that those I
have addressed so far create a good schematic map of the general sorts of position that have
currency. I have examined some specific problems with each position, and I would now like to
suggest that these specific problems share some important characteristics. These problems must
be remedied in order for a theory of warrant to account for and effectively guide our actual
epistemic practices. Pragmatism about warrant provides this remedy by addressing their common
faults.
Most of the time we can go about evaluating the warrant of a belief without taking into
account our own role in the evaluation. We can do so because we are mostly surrounded (or
perhaps mostly surround ourselves) with people that have similar epistemic intuitions as we do
and with situations that do not test our evaluative limits. Taking advantage of this state of affairs,
epistemologists have mostly gone about creating theories of warrant with the implicit assumption
that there is one right way to go about evaluating it. Internalism relied on global structural
features of a believer’s doxastic architecture for standards of warrant, and the skeptic exploited
this placement (and the exclusion of attributor factors) to provide an unanswerable challenge.
Externalism located these standards in the more concrete realm of the functioning of our
cognitive faculties, but left out the normative aspect of warrant attribution in favor of anchoring
beliefs in truth. This approach failed because truth may not be as solid an anchor as it seems at
first. Evidentialism moved the anchor from truth to one’s evidence, but still failed to account for
the normative standards employed.
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As a proposed corrective to these views, I will examine why people value certain beliefs
without assuming that everybody always does so for the same reason. To do this, I will propose a
theory of how we come to share points of view on the warrant of a belief. It is this process, I
argue, that makes a belief warranted. I call my view pragmatism about warrant because it relies
on the pragmatics of human interaction to explain the workings of warrant. This reliance makes
it similar to the views of the original pragmatists (especially William James), the neo-pragmatists
Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Donald Davidson, and those more recent inheritors of this
tradition like Michael Williams, John McDowell, and Stephen Stich. Like Rorty’s, the
pragmatism I develop below will see the evaluation of beliefs as the result of our practices and
conversations, but, like Putnam’s, it will allow for subject-independent standards for good and
bad beliefs. In order to figure out what we should believe and why, I will engage mostly in the
descriptive task of explaining how we determine the answers to these questions in our various
discourses. In this, I shall be guided by Wittgenstein’s principle that “what people accept as
justification is shown by how they think and live”.xxxiv I shall mainly defer prescriptive
statements to the specific discourses themselves, but I will have some things to say about
choosing between rival discourses and why some are better than others.
To get started let us examine a simple case of belief evaluation. 4-year-old Leila is
looking out her window and says to her mother, “look! A squirrel!” Her mother looks out the
same window and sees a squirrel. She judges Leila’s belief—that there is a squirrel outside the
window—to be warranted and praises her for it. In this instance of belief evaluation, and in many
others like it, there are three key elements: a believer, a belief, and an evaluator. Leila, the
believer, expresses (albeit somewhat indirectly) her belief that there is a squirrel outside of her
window at that moment. Leila’s mother, the evaluator, understands the belief that Leila has
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expressed, and evaluates its warrant by looking out the window. In general, epistemologists have
focused on the first two aspects of this triad: the believer and the belief. They have proposed
aspects of the believer and the belief that affect the evaluation of the belief’s warrant. By doing
so, they have left out a crucial part of the picture: the evaluator. It shall be my concern to reinsert
the evaluator into this picture and examine what it takes for her to make warrant evaluations.
The relationship between evaluator, believer, and beliefs can be usefully compared to that
between interpreter, author, and text or to that between listener, speaker, and utterance. Using the
former comparison, the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer can provide the initial steps to
understanding the evaluation of warrant. Most of his work focused on textual hermeneutics, in
which an interpreter interacts with a text and its author, but many of his more general
considerations are analogous to those that concern us. Indeed, sometimes we perform epistemic
evaluations on the beliefs stated or implied in a text. Aspects of his analysis can thus be co-opted
for our purposes. One of Gadamer’s most important insights is that “hermeneutics must start
from the position that a person seeking to understand something has a bond to the subject matter
and…has, or acquires, [this] connection from the tradition from which the text speaks”xxxv. When
dealing with texts, this bond can have thick intermediary layers of tradition based on years of
scholarly work, but even the act of interpreting some present subject’s beliefs involves a shared
connection to a subject matter (and a tradition). Both the evaluator and the believer must make
sense of the beliefs in question, and doing so involves a shared way of thinking about the topic at
hand and what sort of beliefs are appropriate in dealing with it. In engaging with the same
subject matter as the subject, the evaluator participates in the same tradition—which will be
roughly equivalent to what I will call “engaging in the same form of life”—as the subject.xxxvi
While the evaluator’s remove may allow her to reflect on the believer’s situation and thus
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evaluate the believer’s beliefs more deeply than the believer herself may be able to,xxxvii the
evaluator must have enough common ground with the believer to be able to make some sense of
her beliefs. The act of making sense of a belief is the act of interpreting and we need common
ground to interpret.
Donald Davidson has offered parallel considerations in comparing evaluator, believer,
and beliefs to listener, speaker, and utterance.xxxviii He argues that in order to interpret another’s
statements, we must assume that we share a background way of thinking about the world with
them. Without this background, we would be unable to make any sense of another’s words. In
order to share a background, we must take for granted that we see things in much the same way,
or, to put it in his terms, we have a “general agreement on beliefs”. This is not to say that we
make some conscious decision about our agreement; rather, the very act of interpreting—of
understanding what somebody is trying to say—automatically involves such an assumption of
agreement. This agreement is closely parallel to Gadamer’s concept of a bond to the subject
matter. In both cases, and, by extension, in the epistemic case with which we are concerned, the
item to be interpreted can only successfully be interpreted if the interpreter and the
author/speaker have the same idea of what is being addressed by the interpreted item.
In the epistemic case, the evaluator and the believer must share common ground against
which the belief can come into view. Leila’s mother had to understand what Leila was talking
about in order to even begin to evaluate the warrant of the belief that there is a squirrel outside
the window. Epistemologists are in a similar position in evaluating the belief of any believer that
comes up on epistemological discourse, even if that believer is a fictional figment of the
epistemologist’s imagination. I think a good first blush way to think about what goes into
establishing the common ground between evaluator and believer can be found in the concept of a
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form of life. Roughly, a form of life is a way one goes about a particular activity. When people
go about a particular activity in similar ways (which, of course, people generally will do if they
are actually engaged in the same activity), they share common ground at least on the way that
activity works and the subject with which it deals. When people share common ground on an
epistemic activity, an epistemic context arises in which the epistemic status of beliefs can be
considered. Thus, warrant evaluations are context relative. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves.
First we must understand what exactly a form of life is and what it means for a believer and an
evaluator to share one. In order to do this we must first clear up the notion of common ground.
How we establish common ground has mainly concerned philosophers of language, but
many important theoretical constructs found in this work apply to forms of life more generally.
Specifically, work on coordination games following the example of David Lewis (who borrowed
the concept from Thomas Schelling) can help us understand how common ground gets
established in general. I will use as my guide the more recent work of Herbert Clark, who has
entered the conversation started by Lewis from the perspective of psycholinguistics and has
moved it forward both theoretically and experimentally.
Clark begins with a simple idea: “everything we do is rooted in information we have
about our surroundings, activities, perceptions, emotions, plans, interests. Everything we do
jointly with others is also rooted in this information, but only in that part we think they share
with us.”xxxix This part is common ground. Common ground is a necessary condition for
successful joint activity. An activity, in his sense, is a “goal-defined, socially constituted,
bounded [event] with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of
allowable contributions”,xl and a joint activity is simply an activity where more than one
participant is involved. Warrant evaluation is a joint activity because it always involves at least
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one evaluator and one believer.19 Joint activities can be seen as solving the aforementioned
coordination problems, where two or more people have “common interests, or goals, and each
person’s actions depend on the actions of the other”.xli Such activities include playing a duet,
rowing a boat, kissing, and playing soccer. In order to achieve the goals of these activities, one
must both act successfully and coordinate one’s actions with the other participants in the activity.
The coordination with others is where common ground comes in. One must share common
ground with the other participants to coordinate with them.
In order for a given item (belief, proposition, experience, etc.) to be common ground for a
community, Clark argues (following Lewis), three things must be true of it.xlii (1) Every member
of the community in question must have information that a given state of affairs holds. (2) The
state of affairs must indicate to every member of the community that every member of that
community has information that the state of affairs holds. (3) The state of affairs must indicate
the item in question to every member of the community. Note that these conditions must apply
simply for the members of communities to make sense of the item—in order for it to be
meaningful for them. For a belief to be warranted, it must not only be interpretable/meaningful to
the evaluator, it must also be evaluated positively by the standards she is employing. More on
what causes this evaluation will come later—for now we are simply focusing on what it takes for
a belief to be entered for consideration.
In any case, this tripartite formulation leaves the most crucial relation hanging in the
balance: what does it take for a state of affairs to indicate something to somebody, and, more
pertinently, how can a given state of affairs indicate the same thing to multiple people? One way
19

The believer and the evaluator can be the same person. I can evaluate my own beliefs. However, I think in these
cases one adopts a critical persona to evaluate one’s own belief and thus simulates a joint activity. Clark argues that
we might see talking to one’s self as formatted similarly to a joint activity because conversation is the basic form of
language use and we just mimic it in non-basic forms. I’m not sure that I want to endorse this controversial position,
but it is a tangential issue that merits consideration elsewhere.
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a given state of affairs can act as a basis for common ground in this way is for that state of affairs
to be part of a convention that the community shares. Lewis explores this possibility in rigorous
depth. I want to suggest that forms of life work roughly like convention does in these
circumstances, and in fact address more broadly what is needed to get at this relation.
The notion of a form of life is Wittgenstein’s. In discussing how meaning works, he says
that “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life”.xliii And, a bit later on, “the term
language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of
an activity, or a form of life”.xliv I want to generalize the concept of form of life beyond mere
language use, and I think we can find the seeds for this generalization already present in
Wittgenstein’s conception. As mentioned before, a form of life is a way that somebody goes
about a particular activity. By calling linguistic activity a series of language games, Wittgenstein
is bringing out the fact that language use is always embedded in an activity and that human
activity is always governed by some set of rules. In joint activities more generally, people
proceed according to rules—explicit or implicit. Though many joint activities use language to
accomplish their goals (to win their coordination games), not all do.
Different forms of life have different sets of rules. Physicists are physicists because they
engage with a certain type of information in a certain way—whatever makes this type of data and
this method of engagement distinctive constitutes the form of life of a physicist qua being a
physicist (i.e. when dealing with the subject of physics). The physicist’s way of going about
things allows her to participate in contexts where different aspects of physics are under
discussion or contemplation. One could similarly find forms of life for mathematicians, spiritual
healers, epistemologists, jazz musicians, or any other method of meaningful (that is,
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semiological) engagement with the world. Any sort of joint activity brings with it a form of life
and thus a set of rules for engagement with that activity.
But what does all of this have to do with epistemology? Wittgenstein regarded the
certainty involved with knowing “not as something akin go hastiness or superficiality, but as a
form of life”, though he thought this was “very badly expressed and probably badly thought as
well”.xlv What I think is badly thought about this aphorism is the notion that we have to deal with
certainty in dealing with the value of beliefs. What Wittgenstein wanted to get at by addressing
the certainty involved with knowledge (in using the concept of certainty he was merely following
the Zeitgeist, specifically, the precedent set by Moore), was the quality associated with beliefs
that acted as justifiers for other beliefs without themselves being justified. More revealing in this
respect is his comment that the end of justification “is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an
ungrounded way of acting”.xlvi This ungrounded way of acting need not involve certainty or even
knowledge. It need only involve the simple fact that what an evaluator take as good reasons for
some belief depends on the context in which that belief arises, which depends on the common
ground between the evaluator and the believer, which depends on which form of life the
evaluator and the believer are participating in. A form of life brings with it rules for engagement,
which includes common ground on standards for warrant within that form of life.
Relatedly, Martin Heidegger thought that knowledge was a “founded mode of being”,
which means, roughly, that the standards for knowledge arise out of prerational action in the
world.xlvii This insight can be adjusted for our considerations of warrant. In our dealings with the
world, we gain implicit understanding of it. This understanding is beholden to our practical
engagement—how we see the world depends on what activities we are engaged in within the
world. Edmund Husserl reframed Heidegger’s notion in this way: “for the human being in his
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surrounding world there are many types of praxis, and among them is this peculiar and
historically late one, theoretical praxis”.xlviii Theoretical praxis (conceptual interaction with the
world) maintains certain important qualities of more primitive manners of engaging in the world.
Less developed manners of interacting with the world differ depending the material with
which they deal and the outcome that they hope to accomplish (think of the differences between,
e.g., carpentry and husbandry), and conceptual interaction with the world maintains this pattern.
Indeed, as Clark, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Husserl have all pointed out, conceptual
interaction with the world works only in service of these less developed activities. The
differences between activities underlie the varying standards for judging human behavior—one
can only judge the quality of the actions within a given activity based on the pragmatic
considerations of that activity. Warrant is one type of standard that we use for certain types of
activities. To put it another way, given the fact that warrant arises in a founded mode of being
and the fact that our activities generally have at least a vague telos that guides how they proceed,
we can conclude that standards of warrant depend on something like the telos of a given set of
behaviors. If one does not like the concept of built-in teleologies, then the same point can be
expressed by specifying that standards of warrant depend on what the activity at hand sees itself
as doing (or is seen as doing when viewed correctly). I think, though, that the concept of
teleologies employed here should be somewhat uncontroversial. It only implies the goal-directed
nature of activities already briefly discussed above in the context of Clark’s views. If Clark’s
arguments for conceiving of joint activities as solutions to coordination problems are successful,
then it takes only the short step just mentioned to see that standards of warrant depend on the
telos of the activity in question/coordination problem to be solved. But even if the concept of
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teleology still seems problematic, the salient point is that the methodology of a given form of life
dictates how warrant can be accomplished within that form of life.xlix
There is a slightly different way to see how forms of life create contexts for warrant
evaluation. Engaging in a form of life excludes the discussion or questioning of a certain set of
beliefs—the beliefs that form what Wittgenstein would call the "hinge" of a discursive form of
life. Michael Williams has argued that this exclusion depends on the “methodological necessity”
implicit in any given form of life. Given the methodology of the discourse at hand (the rules of
the activity), we cannot move forward with the discussion unless we simply leave aside certain
questions and lines of argument.l As Sellars has argued, our discourse “is a self-correcting
enterprise which can put any claim into jeopardy, though not all at once”.li By setting aside
certain questions and lines of argument, the evaluator and the believer delimit the questions and
lines of argument relevant to the present context. Their very engagement in a given subject
matter generates methodological necessity. When two or more human beings share a form of life,
they agree on a set of rules for engagement with each other and with the subject of discussion.
These rules make some subjects of discussion off-limits in the sense that to take on such subjects
would be to adopt a distinct set of rules;lii it would be to take on a different form of life. People
do not just agree on a set of rules because their opinions on the subject happen to overlap,
however. As with Wittgenstein’s rules for language use, the agreement here “is not agreement in
opinions but in form of life”.liii Evaluator and believer are bound by the subject matter, by their
shared background in the topic at hand. The very way they go about their discourse establishes
its subject matter, which beliefs go unquestioned while engaging in it, and its standards of
warrant. “It is anchored in all [their] questions and answers, so anchored that [they] cannot touch
it”. liv
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Because the way different groups of human beings interact with the world together is
often glossed as “culture”, we might think of form of life as the aspects of culture relevant to
epistemology. Or perhaps I should simply say that forms of life are epistemic culture. I mean
culture here in a fairly broad sense, such as that defined by psychologist Triandis as “a pattern of
shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self-definitions, norms, role-definitions, and
values…organized around a theme”lv or, especially, by psychologists Markus et al. as
“interpretive frameworks”.lvi “Culture” in this sense includes everything from the contemporary
western world to medieval Muslim theologians to trekkies. As culture is notoriously difficult to
define, searching for a clear-cut definition of form of life may be quixotic. Nevertheless, a
sketchy outline of categories of things shared when people share an epistemic culture/form of life
would include:lvii language, a set of experiences, acquired knowledge and/or prejudices (i.e.
common sense), logical intuitions, notions of power/authority, et al. Through these categories
and others, forms of life delimit epistemic context, or the specific state of some discourse.
As with culture in general, we gain forms of life mostly through inheritance. We use our
cultural inheritance as common ground to engage with our cultural peers; indeed, the common
ground itself makes possible such engagement. If we think of forms of life as roughly equivalent
to what McDowell calls “second nature”, then we can turn to his analysis (and that of Gadamer,
from which he borrowed) to understand more deeply how epistemic inheritance works.
McDowell suggests that we “generalize the way Aristotle conceives of the molding of ethical
character [to] arrive at the notion of having one’s eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring a
second nature”.lviii He follows the German tradition in calling this cultural awakening “Bildung”.
Through the process of Bildung, we learn the demands of rationality, “which are there in any
case, whether or not we are responsive to them”lix (this point is essential to understanding
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Bildung, and will be developed further below). Bildung transmits a manner of looking at the
world, a series of prejudices (good or bad),20 that guide our epistemic lives. Wittgenstein argues
that in order to follow a rule, we must have been trained to do so. A rule only guides “insofar as
there exists a regular use of [the rule], a custom”.lx Bildung passes such customs down to us.
Through Bildung, we learn what sorts of questions to ask, how to answer different sorts of
questions, and (at least roughly) why to focus on these questions.21 But also as with culture in
general, we can and do question any aspect of our inheritance. We can only question a given
aspect, however, if we use others as friction. It remains impossible to interrogate from outside
any context whatsoever. The best we can do is to question one form of life from the perspective
of another.
Postulating that warrant is relative to contexts created by cultures may smack of the more
controversial conclusions of Rorty. Specifically, it may sound that I am saying that a warranted
belief is just “what our contemporaries will let us get away with saying”.lxi Despite the fact that I
think Rorty is often taken out of context, especially in his more flamboyant rhetorical flourishes,
I want to distance the pragmatism I propose here from this (perceived) position of Rorty’s rather
than engage in an exegetical dispute on his views. Though in a literal sense I am arguing that
warrant is what our contemporaries will let us get away with saying and this position does imply
relativism, the specifics of how these sound bites are cashed out should make my position less
absurd-seeming. Along with Stich, I think that relativism often gets short shrift due to cursory
considerations of its details.lxii

20

See Gadamer on the possibility of good prejudices in Truth and Method, 271-273 et passim.
See Heidegger on das Man and authenticity for an interesting explanation of how culture justifies itself, albeit
incompletely (Being and Time, passim) and Gadamer on the importance of questions (Truth and Method, Section 2,
Chapter 4, Section 3, Part C). I might also note the parallels here to the Reidian position articulated by Plantinga on
the basic-ness of testimony (cf. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, Ch. 5).
21
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When we evaluate one another’s statements, we do so based on non-arbitrary standards of
evaluation. We are governed by the forms of life that underlie our language games. These forms
of life are unified by standards of grammar in the Wittgensteinian sense, which is a series of
rules that we must follow in order to communicate effectively at all. Along with Wittgenstein, I
“[do] not deny that that there is an independent or material reality that we can interact with; the
claim is that this reality has no semantic content outside of language—that we understand it as
reality only as it is acted out through semantic practice”.lxiii Thus, “grammar tells us what kind of
object anything is”lxiv because our forms of life delimit the subject matter of whatever we talk (or
think conceptually) about. Grammar does not make the objects what they are, it only allows us to
think and speak about them and as such gives them the semantic content necessary to be parts of
statements that can be candidates for warrant.
The use of the words "grammar" and "rule" implies that the way we go about a discourse
is not just whatever we can get away with—in the sense that our mistakes that go under the radar
don’t count as mistakes. We are guided by real standards, but, as John McDowell cautions, these
real standards should not be given special ontological status.lxv We can fail to meet the standards
of a given discourse, but the standards of that discourse do depend on the associated activity for
their existence. It is notoriously difficult to explain this insight, but one finds it across a range of
20th century philosophers. Hilary Putnam, for instance: "What is better and what is worse to say
about most questions of real human concern is not just a matter of opinion. Recognizing that this
is so is the essential price of admission to the community of sanity".lxvi Notice that recognizing
that this is so is not a matter of grasping some independent and transcendental standard; it is a
standard implicit and immanent in our classification of statements and people as sane or insane.
Gadamer, who worked in an entirely different tradition, had it that "[guiding principles] are not
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norms to be found in the stars, nor do they have an unchanging place in a natural moral
universe...nor are they mere conventions, but really do correspond to the nature of thing—except
that the latter is always itself determined in each case by the use the moral [or rational]
consciousness makes of them".lxvii Again, to the extent that our normative epistemic principles
correspond to anything, they correspond to how we understand the world, to the traditions that
we have inherited. The following of rules is just part of what it is to successfully do any sort of
joint activity. Wittgenstein cautions that “to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule”.lxviii
Here I think Crispin Wright’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is helpful: “the grasp of [rules] is not
anterior to the ability to give them competent linguistic expression but rather resides in that very
ability”.lxix
So discourses do have standards, but not standards underscored by a transcendent
principle for warrant. For many, this may seem a halfway solution. After all, either our cognitive
faculties are in touch with reality or they’re not; either our reasoning is good or it
isn’t—regardless of what we think about it. Concerning the former, whether or not our faculties
are in touch with reality depends on what we mean by reality and the particular metaphysical
theory of what it means to be in touch with it. These are questions beyond the scope of a humble
essay on warrant. Concerning the latter, we must realize that we do have standards for reasoning
that can be misapplied, and hence on some level do not depend on what we think about them.
This should become clearer in the forthcoming, and I will address it explicitly in more detail later
on.
Now that we have a clearer picture of what a form of life is, let us see how it provides the
appropriate relation for the three conditions for something to be common ground proposed by
Lewis and Clark (who pioneered this territory). We should consider them not in their general
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form but in their epistemic manifestations; that is, we are analyzing what it takes for a belief to
be common ground. (1) The evaluator and the believer must have information that they are in a
certain epistemic context. Evaluator and believer have this information simply by virtue of
participating in the same form of life. Physicists know that they are talking about physics simply
by engaging in the behaviors typical of a physics discussion. Many aspects of the form of life of
physicists could indicate the context: the fact that one is reading a physics journal, the fact that
one is in a physics classroom, the fact that one is speaking to a physicist, or even just the fact that
one is discussing topics that physics addresses. (2) The epistemic context must indicate to the
believer and the evaluator that they both have information that they are in that context. Because
the form of life provides each with information that they are in the context and any given form of
life is just a type of joint activity, the form of life should also indicate to each that the other has
similar information. In other words, their source of information is a shared means of dealing with
the world, so their information should also be shared and this fact should be transparent. (3) The
context must indicate some belief to both the evaluator and the believer. For those with
structuralist or holist tendencies, the way beliefs get set off by forms of life can be thought of in
terms of the Saussurean insight that the meanings of words arise from their contrast with other
words,lxx but, for those who find holism distasteful, it can also be thought of in less theoreticallyladen terms. Suppose Willard is telling Wilfrid why El Greco is his favorite Spanish painter and
he mentions that he especially admires his masterly work in Las Meninas. In order for Wilfrid to
evaluate Willard’s implicit belief that El Greco painted Las Meninas, Wilfrid must have some
idea of who El Greco is, what Las Meninas is, who the painter of Las Meninas was, what
painting is, etc. He must have some idea of these things to even understand the belief that
Willard is communicating, let alone evaluate its warrant. If Wilfrid does not have some
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knowledge of these things, then Willard’s belief may as well be gibberish or he may as well not
be expressing any belief at all.
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THE INSTABILITY OF CONTEXT
So far I have been writing as if forms of life can be clearly delimited from each other. I
noted obviously established forms of life that have relatively evident and unchanging sets of
standards implicit in them. One might even accuse me of having reified forms of life. It eased my
exposition of the basic concept to act as if things were so cut and dried. But while it was
convenient to talk about clear distinctions between forms of life, it was not entirely accurate. At
least three considerations problematize my simplifications. First, forms of life change over time.
Plant biology today differs strongly from its predecessors in the preceding centuries.
Epistemological discussion of the nature of knowledge has seen various dramatic shifts in the
even shorter time frame of the latter half of the twentieth century. Along with such changes come
alterations in rules, standards, and even subject matter. Second, forms of life are not separated by
clear dividing lines. A chemist may dabble in physics or biology—can we set off clear
boundaries between these disciplines? Is a chemist not doing chemistry when talking about
thermodynamics? When one uses a religious justification for a political belief, are they talking
about religion or politics? We could create arbitrary cut-offs, but that would not establish
principled differences between forms of life. Third, new forms of life can be created.
Experimental psychology branched off from philosophy and gradually developed its own
methodologies. Logic merged philosophy and mathematics together at around the same time.
Evolutionary biology only came into existence after Darwin’s work.
Feyerabend notes that, unfortunately for theoretical simplicity and for strict standards of
warrant, “cultures change, they interact with other cultures and the indefiniteness resulting
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therefrom is reflected in their [changing contexts]”.lxxi In terms of Wittgenstein’s extended game
metaphor for forms of life:
We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing
with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many without
finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air,
chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke and
so on. And now someone says: the whole time they are playing a ball game
and following definite rules at every throw. And is there not also the case
where we play and make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one
where we alter them as we go along.lxxii

Even though our activities in the world are not cleanly delimited from each other and
change along with changing interests, fashions, and observations, they still have rules that guide
them. However, the indefiniteness of shifting forms of life does affect how rules work. When we
consider forms of life as more amorphous entities, we should see rules as working horizonally.
The concept of a horizon comes from Edmund Husserl. He posited that as we think about the
world, we are “forever surrounded by an atmosphere of mute, concealed, but cofunctioning
validities”, which form a “vital horizon”.lxxiii (Note the parallel to Wittgenstein, who thought that
one’s hinge propositions were so embedded in one’s activities that one “could not touch”
them.)lxxiv These validities surround us because of how we engage with the world, because of our
form of life. They are horizonal because they point to a series of other validities that go on
indefinitely, just as a literal horizon goes on indefinitely by pointing to other parts of the
landscape. As one engages in different forms of life (however vaguely delimited), which
validities are most relevant, and thus in the clearest focus, shifts. Jürgen Habermas, taking up
Husserl’s notion, has it that horizons “shift with the theme” of the activity at hand, just as “the
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[literal] horizon shifts according to one’s position”.lxxv As we fluidly move from one form of life
to another (and as we create new forms of life), the rules for action change. To say that rules are
horizonal is to say that common ground is established and modified en passant.
Let us examine how this works in a concrete believer-and-evaluator case.22 Suppose
Edmund and Jürgen are having a conversation. Edmund expresses to Jürgen his belief that that
nuclear war will wipe out mankind before global warming can even come close. Jürgen thinks
that Edmund should not hold this belief, and he can appeal to various reasons why not:
unchecked global warming will act faster than Edmund thinks, Edmund has not considered the
factor of mutually assured destruction, Edmund should think that Obama’s nuclear
nonproliferation treaties are steps in the right direction, etc. Which of the reasons that Jürgen
appeals to will shift the topic of discussion slightly, and along with it the rules and standards by
which Jürgen and Edmund can evaluate each other’s beliefs. If Jürgen appeals to his faith in
Obama’s actions, then Edmund would judge his belief based on international political grounds.
Which facts and analyses the two of them will appeal to in such a discussion would be quite
different than if they had taken up the discussion of how fast global warming will take effect.
No matter which of the discussions the two take up, they will have to take for granted
certain beliefs and rules in order to move forward with it. These taken-for-granteds serve as the
common ground that allows them to take part in the joint activity of conversation. Within a given
conversational context, a form of life “appears as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken
convictions that participants in communication draw upon” while engaging in discourse. lxxvi
Notice that these convictions are unshaken and not unshakeable. We take certain things for
granted because we must in order to engage in any sort of meaningful discussion—which is to
22

In this conversation, and in many others, the roles of evaluator and believer switch back and forth depending on
how the conversation goes. At any given statement of a belief, however, one could pick out a believer and an
evaluator.
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say, any discussion at all—but we could, in principle, challenge any of these taken-for-granteds.
To do so, however, would be to reorient the focus of discussion and shift contexts. Recall, after
all, that taken-for-granteds have a horizonal structure. What we take for granted in one situation
could be under the highest level of scrutiny in another, but other beliefs and rules would have to
be taken for granted in that other situation.
But how do interlocutors know that they are taking the same things for granted? How is
common ground established without clear delineations between forms of life? More pressingly
for epistemology, how does an evaluator know that she and the believer are following the same
rules and taking the same beliefs for granted? To answer these questions, we must reexamine the
interpretation relation that I discussed when first introducing the triad of evaluator, believer, and
belief. In doing so, we will notice two seemingly incompatible tendencies. On the one hand, the
evaluator must use empathy to try to figure out what the believer has in mind. In conversation,
this will mean that the evaluator and believer must cooperate to establish common ground. On
the other, in order to understand what the believer has in mind, the evaluator must make use of a
bit of egocentrism. To see the believer as rational, the evaluator will have to compare the
believer to herself.
What I have in mind here is a variant on the Davidsonian principle of charity. To begin
my development of the concept, I want to start with Lewis’s version from “Scorekeeping in a
Language Game”. lxxvii Once again, Lewis effectively uses the technique of comparing everyday
human activity to a game: in this case to the specific game of baseball. In baseball, the score of
the game at any given time can be given by a septuple of numbers representing balls, strikes,
inning, runs, etc. The numbers on this theoretical scoreboard determine what plays are
permissible by players in service of their goal of winning the game (which involves keeping
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certain numbers of the score high and certain numbers low). Because the score at any given time
depends on what has happened in the game up to that time and which actions are permissible at a
time depends on the score at that time, which actions are permissible at a given time depends on
what has happened in the game up to that time.lxxviii
Lewis then compares the game of baseball to a language game, which we can borrow for
our different sort of joint activity: a justification game, we might say. In fact, Lewis himself
explicitly cites the possibility of warranted assertion as a possible component in
scorekeeping.lxxix The parallel is as follows:
Like components of a baseball score, the components of a conversational
score at a given stage are abstract entities. They may not be numbers, but
they are other set-theoretic constructs: sets of presupposed propositions,
boundaries between permissible and impermissible courses of action, or the
like. What play is correct depends on the score. Sentences depend for their
truth value, or for their acceptability in other respects [including warranted
assertion], on the components of conversational score at the stage of
conversation when they are uttered.lxxx

The score of the conversation, furthermore, “evolves in a more or less rule-governed way”.lxxxi
What Lewis is offering here is a way to see the establishment of common ground as
governed by forms of life while allowing the rules implicit in forms of life to be horizonal. Rules
become strongly situationally dependent: which sort of beliefs will count as warranted depends
on the state of discourse at a particular time. One of the key reasons this analysis is effective is
because it breaks score into a series of components. Rather than seeing preestablished and rigid
forms of life as establishing the common ground necessary to make epistemically evaluative
judgments, we should view common ground as created by various factors governed by their own
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less rigid forms of life. But what would these factors be? I have already suggested some
possibilities above: language, a set of experiences, acquired knowledge and/or prejudices (i.e.
common sense), logical intuitions, and notions of power/authority. Clark cites a different set of
possibilities: community identification, shared expertise, communal lexicons, assumptions about
human nature, norms about how conversations go, present environment (shared perceptual
information), et al.lxxxii Triandis points to a related set: shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations,
self-definitions, norms, role-definitions, and values.lxxxiii Though I think there is some use in
proposing which factors are at work in our creation of common ground, I don’t want to favor one
componential analysis over another. What I want to do, rather, is see what these componential
analyses have in common and what that tells us about our epistemic behavior.
In order to take hold, components of common ground must be shared by evaluator and
believer. Lewis thinks that both believer and evaluator will have a representation of
conversational score at any given point in the conversation.lxxxiv This representation, I think,
should not be taken as some conscious assessment of the situation on the part of the participants.
Rather, which moves participants deem appropriate will indicate (and depend on) their implicit
understanding of the state of discourse. If believer and evaluator have two very different score
representations, then they will be unable to effectively communicate and the evaluator will be
unable to interpret the believer’s belief. However, participants rarely, if ever, explicitly list their
interpretations of the present state of discourse. Generally, the evaluator will have to interpret the
believer’s understanding of the state of discourse by observing the actions the believer takes and
inferring based on general patterns of score-interpretation to behavior pairings.
In order to interpret these pairings as fitting a given pattern, the evaluator’s form of life
must overlap with the believer’s. These overlaps can occur on multiple levels of simultaneously
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increasing scope and decreasing specificity. For instance, in order to share a language, believer
and evaluator could share anything from grunts and gestures that somebody from most any
culture could understand to English that any English speaker could understand to the dialect of
English that speakers from Savannah, Georgia speak. In order to share norms, one might share
anything from what the difference between a moral and immoral act is (not a specific theory on
what differentiates them, just the ability to differentiate them) to specific views about the
wrongness of free trade zones in third world countries. These levels can be seen as nested within
each other: to be a Baptist is to be a Christian; to know about the ecology of a given ecosystem is
to know things about population biology.lxxxv Sharing higher-level (more specific and shared by
fewer people) factors of common ground, then, implies sharing lower-level components of those
factors. We cannot speak the jargon of French art criticism without speaking French. We cannot
talk about the merits of a particular baseball player without implicitly agreeing on what a
baseball player is.
Suppose John says to Stephen: “I think Ryan Howard will break the record for home runs
in a career”. Stephen’s ability to interpret John’s statement depends on which components of
common ground he shares with John and at what levels they share those components. For
instance, Stephen might know very little about baseball, but he knows that home runs happen in
baseball. Thus he could determine that Ryan Howard is somebody who makes home runs
(whatever that means—something baseball-y) and that John thinks that he is very good at
making home runs. He could also determine that John knows (or purports to know) a good deal
about baseball, that he speaks English, and that John thinks that there is a record for home runs.
Stephen would not be able to do a very good job evaluating the warrant of John’s belief, though.
He does not share enough taken-for-granteds with John to successfully move forward with a
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discussion of John’s assertion. His representation of the conversational score is different enough
from John’s that belief evaluation could not move forward successfully. If, on the other hand,
Stephen knew a great deal about baseball, he and John would have similar representations of
conversational score (even if they did not agree on the particular assertion at hand) and thus be
able to take for granted a great deal more in moving forward. Stephen will be able to evaluate
moves that John makes as appropriate or not because Stephen can characterize John’s
representation of score well.
It still remains to be seen how the evaluator characterizes the believer’s representation of
score, which leaves open the prior question of how an evaluator knows that the believer is
following the same rules and taking the same beliefs for granted. To see how this works it will
help to explore what how interpretation works when anomalies occur—when a participant has
seemed to break a rule—and then to generalize aspects of these behaviors to all interpretation.
Lewis argues that in anomalous cases, participants generally follow the principle of
accommodation. The principle of accommodation states that whatever action is done should be
interpreted as having been done according to the rules. In other words, participants will adjust
the conversational score to accommodate for acts that do not fit with the previous score.lxxxvi
As I mentioned before, the notion of an accommodating tendency comes from Davidson
(and, before him, Quine), who calls it the principle of charity. In Davidson’s formulation, in
order to understand others, “we must count them as right in most matters”.lxxxvii So, in cases
where a seemingly absurd belief is espoused, we generally accommodate it by assuming that, for
instance, the believer uses her terms slightly differently or has uttered a malapropism, rather than
thinking that the believer is woefully out of touch with reality. We do this because “if we merely
know that someone holds a certain sentence to be true, we know neither what he means by the
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sentence nor what belief his holding it true represents”, and as such must interpret both the
meaning of the sentence and the belief that he holds true.lxxxviii We cannot perform this
interpretive action without assuming a general agreement on beliefs, because the possibility of
interpreting another’s belief successfully depends on taking similar things for granted. It is hard
for us to even know what to make of somebody who asserts a belief that we think outrageously
mistaken. Generally it will make more sense to interpret such a believer as meaning something
different from what we mean rather than to think she could believe something like that.
The principle of charity comes out especially clearly in anomalous cases, but Davidson
argues that it applies to all cases of interpretation. In general, we understand others’ beliefs by
considering them generally warranted by our own standards of warrant. Stephen Stich refines
this point significantly. He argues that in order to have an intentional characterization of a
believer’s beliefs at all, an evaluator must adopt something like the principle of charity.
Following Richard Grandy, though, he modifies the principle of charity into the principle of
humanity. The principle of humanity has it that when we interpret “the pattern of relations
among beliefs, desires, and the world”, we must interpret them to be “as similar to our own as
possible”.lxxxix For most cases the principle of charity and the principle of humanity will overlap,
but in some they will not. Suppose Taylor walks into the library and sees somebody that looks
like Kanye sitting at a desk. She thinks to herself “Oh no! Kanye is sitting at a desk in this
library!” However, the man sitting at the desk is not Kanye, but, coincidentally, Kanye is sitting
at another desk in the same library. The principle of charity seems to instruct us to interpret
Taylor’s belief as true, but it seems that in fact she holds a false belief about the man that looks
like Kanye. The principle of humanity recommends that we interpret his belief as false, because,
in the same situation, our belief would be about the man we saw (and thus false), not the man we
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had no thought about. In order to successfully characterize another’s beliefs, we must see them
as “reasonably similar to our own”. In the case of a conditional belief, “if a [believer’s] mental
state does not interact with other mental states in a pattern which approximates the pattern
exhibited by our own conditional beliefs, it does not count as a conditional belief”.xc A similar
argument would go for perceptual beliefs, beliefs about baseball, etc. What it means for a mental
state to be a belief of a certain sort is for that mental state to behave like what we think beliefs of
a certain sort behave like (what our own beliefs of that sort behave—or would behave—like). If
we were to encounter a mental state that behaved very dissimilarly to any of our beliefs, we
would have a hard time characterizing it as a belief.23
It is important to be clear about what it means for a mental state to be similar enough to
our own to count as a belief. On the one hand, we obviously think that people that disagree with
us on a large number of things have beliefs. On the other, there are some purported beliefs that
seem so outlandish that we have trouble assimilating them into our concept of belief; we might
think that the person who seems to hold them is in fact being disingenuous or doesn’t properly
understand the issue or is using different terminology. To get at this happy medium, I think we
should turn back to Lewis’s concept of the principle of accommodation. By asking how
dissimilar somebody’s mental states need to be for an evaluator to struggle in characterizing
them as beliefs, we are asking how many rules a believer needs to break in order for the
evaluator to be unable to accommodate their “play” (their mental state, their utterance). What
goes on when an evaluator compares a believer’s mental architecture to hers is not as egocentric
or chauvinistic as it may sound at first—or as Stich accuses it of being.
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I’m not sure that “mental state” is the right term to be used here, because I’m not sure that in interpreting
somebody’s behaviors and words as indicative of this or that belief we are always pointing to mental states of that
person. However, I will follow Stich’s usage here for ease of exposition.
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To interpret a believer’s mental state, an evaluator must share common ground with the
believer. To establish common ground with a believer, an evaluator must match up her own
forms of life (components of conversational score) with those of the believer. If a believer seems
to believe something anomalous to the rules of the forms of life involved in a particular context,
then the evaluator has to adjust her representation of the context (the conversational score) to
accommodate these beliefs as best she can. Interpretation requires overlaps in forms of life, and
thus to accommodate the evaluator must assume that the believer is following the rules of a form
of life that they share but that is slightly different from that of the context in which the evaluator
saw them as being in. Even in cases where accommodation is not obviously necessary,
evaluators interpret believer’s behaviors and utterances as according to some form of life with
which the evaluator is familiar. Accommodation is often tacitly involved in this interpretation
due to the horizonal nature of common ground. If this form of life involves beliefs, warrant, and
the like, then the evaluator will interpret behaviors and utterances as expressing beliefs that may
or may not have warrant.
One could go into much more detail over what it means for something to be a belief.
However, this essay is concerned with the next stage of belief evaluation—what it takes for a
belief to be warranted. The evaluation part. The basic concept of warrant evaluation is simple: in
order for an evaluator to interpret a believer’s belief as warranted, the evaluator must think that
the believer has followed the rules of the forms of life that have formed the context for that
belief. To extend the analogy of justification games: the epistemic status of a belief depends on
the conversational score when it is uttered. Because the evaluator cannot interpret the behaviors
(linguistic or otherwise) of a believer as a belief without interpreting that belief as embedded in a
specific context—as attempting to follow the rules of some form of life—the evaluator cannot
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judge the warrant of a belief without asking whether the believer has followed the rules the form
of life in which the behavior occurred.
Recall, though, that to create any given context for warrant evaluation, multiple
components of common ground on multiple levels are being employed. To see this concretely,
let us return to the case of John and Stephen. When John enters his belief that Ryan Howard will
break the record for career home runs, Stephen’s ability to evaluate the warrant of this belief
depends on whether or not he shares enough components of common ground with John at a high
enough level. The Stephen who does not know about baseball will be quite unable to evaluate the
warrant of John’s belief because, though he shares some forms of life with John at varying
levels, he does not share the form of life of a baseball fan with him at even close to a high
enough level. He cannot take for granted enough beliefs about baseball to make such a judgment.
However, if John had entered the belief that Tom Cruise will break the record for career home
runs, Stephen would likely be able to evaluate this belief even without much knowledge of
baseball at all. Because Stephen knows that Tom Cruise is an actor and not a professional
baseball player, he will be able to tell that John has made a mistake (or a joke) in entering his
belief that Tom Cruise will achieve some accomplishment that only professional baseball players
can achieve. In this scenario, Stephen needs only his low level knowledge of baseball to be able
to judge the warrant of John’s belief. He does not have to take much knowledge of baseball for
granted.
What evaluators evaluate in deeming a belief warranted or not is roughly what Michael
Williams calls a believer’s epistemic responsibility. The more epistemically responsible a
believer is, the higher personal justification she has in holding a belief.xci A person is personally
justified if she acts according to the rules by which the evaluator is judging her belief. However,
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epistemic responsibility goes both ways. An evaluator must be epistemically responsible by
maintaining the common ground on which to judge a believer’s belief. This basically means that
an evaluator should abide by the principle of humanity, with the added notion that an evaluator
should not just judge whether or not a behavior counts a belief, but also that a believer is acting
how an epistemically responsible person would act. Using the principle of humanity, this latter
judgment becomes a question of how the evaluator would act in a similar epistemic context.24
Generally doing so will mean interpreting the epistemic context charitably for the believer. That
is to say, the evaluator will mostly interpret a believer’s belief as having been entered in an
epistemic context in which it is warranted. Sometimes, of course, this will be impossible. In
some cases this will involve failures of intentional characterization, but in others it will involve a
challenge to a belief. Only the latter are of interest in the present discussion.
Let us return to the case where Willard and Wilfrid are discussing Willard’s aesthetic
preferences. In order for this discussion to move forward, many things must be shared taken-forgranteds. It must be taken for granted that El Greco was a painter, the meaning of “painter”, what
Las Meninas refers to, etc. But now it arises that Willard and Wilfrid do not share something.
They do not both think that El Greco painted Las Meninas. This belief strikes Wilfrid as
mistaken because of the context that has been built up to this point: the utterance “El Greco
painted Las Meninas” only has significance relative to the forms of life that make these words
mean anything for Wilfrid. Wilfrid thinks the belief problematic because it seems to violate a
standard of the context in which he and Willard have embedded themselves. According to the
rules of the forms of life that Wilfrid interprets Willard’s belief to be following, the utterance is
posited as a true statement that relates a painter to a painting. Only because Wilfrid understands
24

Again, the evaluator would have to judge that the believer is acting reasonably similarly to herself, according to
the explication of how this is done provided above.
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the utterance as such does it seem unwarranted. The problem resides in a relatively narrowscoped component of common ground, but a problem in any breadth of scope can bring a belief
under scrutiny. For instance, stating something logically impossible is quite broadly unwarranted
while stating something about the Theaetetus that every scholar has found reason to dispute is
quite narrowly unwarranted. A broadly unwarranted belief will oftentimes be more difficult to
interpret, because it is more difficult to accommodate something that seems obviously false. It
may seem that the belief entered has been badly worded or even disingenuous. Thus, most of the
epistemic action occurs in the relatively narrow-scope aspects of the various components that
make up a context.
If the evaluator expresses her challenge to the believer, then the process of belief defense,
or justification, starts. The internalist had argued that in acts of justification we see the true
reasons that the believer held her belief. However, I think that what we really see is reasons that
the believer believes the evaluator will accept. The process of belief defense, of justification, is
not necessarily an unveiling of one’s preexistent reasons for holding a belief—though that is a
tactic that we employ at times—but rather a presentation of a series of potential reasons that a
belief should be considered warranted, given what the believer takes the evaluator to agree with
her on. The believer makes her epistemically responsible attempt to return to common ground. In
deciding what the believer will agree with her on, the believer must rely on the same
representations of conversational score and principles of humanity that I sketched above. The
believer wants to be seen as epistemically responsible, so she presents reasons why her belief
follows the rules of the justification game in which it was played. So, for instance, imagine that
Wilfrid says that he actually thinks Velasquez painted Las Meninas. If Willard wants to defend
the warrant of his original belief, he had better cite some source that he thinks Wilfrid will see as
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a good indicator of the authorship of Las Meninas. What he thinks Wilfrid will count as a good
indicator will depend on his interpretation of Wilfrid’s representation of the score.
Justification will (ideally) continue until the evaluator becomes satisfied that the
challenged belief is warranted. Foundationalists of various sorts have thought the only real
stopping points were basic beliefs. If one truly named all one’s reasons for holding a belief, one
would eventually come to a foundation. My view is quite different, but will lead us into some
familiar territory. To make it clear, I want to borrow a notion from Daniel Dennett. When talking
about moral discourse, he appeals to the concept of “conversation stoppers”, which are “a variety
of uncertain and temporary equilibria...tending to accrete pearly layers of supporting dogma
which themselves cannot [necessarily] withstand extended scrutiny but do actually serve on
occasion, blessedly, to deflect and terminate consideration”.xcii What he has in mind here can be
generalized to epistemic justification. Indeed, justification stoppers, as I will call the modified
concept, sound a whole lot like beliefs taken for granted on account of methodological necessity,
or Wittgensteinian hinges.
This similarity should not be too surprising. Evaluators challenge believers because they
think that believers have violated a rule that the two have taken for granted. Believers defend
themselves because they believe that they have not violated any rules. In order for the believer to
convince the evaluator that she has not violated any rules, the believer must appeal to things that
she thinks will indicate to the evaluator that her belief follows the rules. A believer will
effectively defend her belief if she appeals to things that they both take for granted, which are
things that form the hinges of discourse. We should not, however, take this state of affairs as an
indication that the believer unveils the pre-existent structure of beliefs when engaging in belief
defense, as the internalist picture implies. We do, often, point to beliefs we already knew
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supported the challenged belief, but some of our most useful insights (that is, new ways of
thinking of things, not beliefs that already underlay our challenged belief) come in the heat of
belief defense. When asked to defend a belief, we just as often rationalize as ratiocinate. It is
possible to discover one’s assumptions.
What makes justification stoppers “uncertain and temporary” is the fact that they vary
across contexts. But, again, common ground is not fixed. Whether or not a given belief counts as
a justification stopper depends on the participants; it stops justification if they share a
justificatory point of view on it. This point of view could be that the challenge was answered
satisfactorily, that the believer realizes she is unjustified, or that the participants realize that they
just are not on the same page. A justification stopper might be terminatingly convincing or
unconvincing.25 The deflection and termination of justification is not “blessed”, it is based on the
profane fact that we humans need to see things similarly to engage in justification in the first
place.
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justification.

Herrine 64

OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
Justification stops once the participants see eye-to-eye on what can be taken for granted
or once they realize that they won't be able to do so. But couldn't the justification just keep
going? Couldn't the evaluator just keep challenging potential reasons for a belief ad nauseam?
Aren't we back in Agrippa's Trilemma? It seems that in principle two people with extraordinarily
different points of view could find themselves unable to end justification, because they are
unable to find common ground. Indeed, it seems that this shows up all the time in practice. Look
at the disagreements between liberals and conservatives, for example.
Clearly, this possibility is unacceptable. Many think that only two ways of resolving it are
possible. These responses are reminiscent of those of the two philosophical types that William
James described as “tough-minded” and “tender-minded”.xciii The first claims that some stopping
points are inherently superior to others. Most often the superiority is justified by claiming that
the stopping points that the tough-minded theorist has in mind more accurately represent reality.
The tender-minded theorist, on the other hand, claims that no stopping point is better than any
other. Indeed, she might go so far as to claim that no point of view on reality is better than any
other, so we should happy adopt a pluralist multiculturalism where we go by the motto “believe
and let believe”.
The latter position seems to imply exactly the unfortunate conclusion that the initial
objection found unacceptable. If no potential reason for belief is better than any other, then what
is to stop justification between two people from very different epistemic backgrounds from
continuing infinitely? Additionally, one could be guilty of any of the three seemingly faulty
options in Agrippa’s Trilemma and still be considered epistemically responsible according to this
tender-minded theorist. Furthermore, it certainly seems that some reasons for a belief are better

Herrine 65
than others. Trivial examples of bad reasons include: “because I said so”, “because I believe
everything my elders tell me”, and “because the sun is blue”. Supposing the tender-minded
theorist could somehow dispatch with these, she would still need to deal with less trivial cases of
explaining combustion in terms of phlogiston and explaining one’s opposition to Obama’s
presidency in terms of his plot to destroy the US government from the inside.
The tough-minded theorist has a different set of problems. How can one explain the
inherent superiority of some reasons over others in a non-question-begging manner? We always
run the risk of simply pointing out the reasons that we value according to our present forms of
life without explaining why this form of life has some inherent superiority. The most common
attempt to avoid this problem is to say that some reasons (and some forms of life) better
represent reality. This only pushes the problem back, though. For what makes some belief
represent reality better than another belief? The “better” here implies a value judgment, which
would require us to explain why we value this form of representation rather than another. Or, as
Rorty, puts it, we can find “no independent test of accuracy of representation…no test distinct
from the success which is supposedly explained by its accuracy”, and without such a test, we
cannot understand what an appeal to better representation amounts to.xciv
More careful critiques of these approaches have been undertaken elsewhere, but what
concerns me in responding to the objection to which they respond is finding a middle way
between the two. My proposal is this: justification stops through an appeal to reasons whose
superiority is immanent to forms of life. When we encounter somebody who thinks about things
quite differently from the way we do, the best thing to do is to find at what level we can find
common ground and proceed from there. We certainly can find some set of standards in
common, even if these are low-level components of common ground. Suppose that, for instance,
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Liz says to Jean that she believes in ghosts. Jean does not believe in ghosts, so she challenges
Liz’s belief. If either is to convince the other that her belief is warranted and the others mistaken,
then she must appeal to evidence/reasons for belief that the other will find epistemically
acceptable. That is, the evidence appealed to would have to be part of their common ground. Liz
and Jean will probably disagree on quite a few epistemic things: which other people’s beliefs
about ghosts that can be trusted, for example. But ultimately there will be some agreed upon
standard against which Liz and Jean can test Liz’s belief.
What Liz and Jean will likely have to appeal to is the cash value of Liz’s belief; they will
have to “set it at work within the steam of [their] experience[s]”.xcv Another way to put this idea
is to say that Liz and Jean will have to evaluate the practical results of holding such a belief. By
“practical results” I do not mean whether the belief would make Liz better equipped to cope with
her mother’s death or something like that; rather, I mean the implications the belief would have
in our epistemic interactions with the world. To determine the worth of a belief in ghosts, Liz
and Jean might examine what such a belief would suggest that we would encounter in certain
situations—we might see the image of a dead loved one or hear one communicating with us from
beyond the grave. Liz would have to specify which of these conditions she thinks show that
ghosts exist and Jean would have to specify which conditions she would find acceptable. If they
do not encounter such situations, or if these situations could be better explained (by their mutual
standards) by other beliefs, Jean should think that Liz has no good reason to believe in ghosts.26
What makes a given stopping point better than another is the extent to which the
evaluator and the believer find that stopping point convincing. A stopping point is effective only
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Obviously the situation here is much more complicated than these vague pronouncements can do justice to. There
has been much ink spilled in the philosophy of science about what it means to test theories, and what I mean to point
out here is merely that these sorts of issues are relevant not only for scientific interaction with the world, but also for
everyday epistemic encounters therewith.
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if it stops justification. This discourse-dependence makes stopping points horizonal, mutable, and
open to challenge in different contexts. A reason that stops justification in one instance of belief
defense may be the belief being justified in another. Pragmatism about warrant thus allows for
virtuous circles in justification. “We can only make honest efforts to eliminate the sorts of
defects we know our thinking risks, and perhaps to expand our conception of ways things might
go wrong, so as to be on guard against other potential sources of error. The best we can achieve
is always to some extent provisional and inconclusive, but that is no reason to succumb to the
fantasy of an external validation”.xcvi Eliminating defects involves challenging
assumptions/stopping points. But to do so, we must maintain other assumptions.
The easy follow-up objection to my response so far is that I have merely pushed the
problem back a step. Everything with my position is hunky-dory if believer and evaluator can
find some common ground, but what if they have incompatible standards? To put it concretely, if
Liz simply does not accept any of Jean’s reasons for rejecting a belief in ghosts, it seems that
pragmatism about warrant gives Jean no resources to respond to Liz’s belief, and, as such, the
pragmatist must count both Liz and Jean as epistemically responsible even though their beliefs
are incompatible. Suppose Jean has even explicitly explained absurd and contradictory
implications of Liz’s belief and yet Liz still persists in holding it. Even then, the objector says,
my pragmatism must allow Liz to maintain her belief in ghosts with a clear epistemic
conscience.
Not surprisingly, I do not think that my pragmatism forces me to allow irrational
believers to maintain their beliefs with clear epistemic consciences. Rather, I think that the price
they pay for the ability to maintain their beliefs in the face of defeaters is epistemic
irresponsibility, or irrationality. Such believers have not paid Putnam’s aforementioned “price of

Herrine 68
admission into the community of sanity”.xcvii But doesn’t this still let such believers off too
easily? Aren’t we just giving them their own little world of warrant without condemning their
belief? Again, I think not. What we should say here is rather like what Wittgenstein said about
somebody who doubts whether the earth existed 100 years ago: “I would not understand [him]
for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence
and what not”.xcviii Pragmatism does not let an epistemically irresponsible believer get off scotfree to go live in her own world of warrant. It relegates the believer to a world where the things
she says simply do not mean the same things that we mean when we say them. One cannot, for
instance, claim to believe in ghosts and then reject all of our attempts to nail down a definition of
ghosts without offering an alternative that matches up with our conceptions in some way. This
would mean that she simply does not understand what we mean by ghosts, and hence cannot
participate in any discussions thereof. The price of avoiding standards of discourse is the failure
to mean anything by one’s utterances.
Even worse than that, it will be hard to determine if what the believer purportedly
believes even counts as a belief. After all, in order for us to successfully characterize a person’s
behaviors as a belief, those behaviors need to function similarly to beliefs with which we are
familiar (to beliefs in forms of life that we know about). If a person rejects any attempt of ours to
characterize her belief according to rules with which we are familiar, then we will have a hard
time counting her purported belief as a belief. If this is not too high a price to pay for getting
one’s own world of warrant, I do not know what is.
There remains, however, the possibility that points of view widely divergent from today’s
common sense might actually provide new and better standards for warrant about a given topic.
A person who seems to have absurd beliefs may actually turn out to have better ones that we do
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for accomplishing our epistemic goals. Philosophers of science have explored this possibility
extensively since Kuhn and Feyerabend. I do not wish to add to this literature here except to note
that we should, as Feyerabend cautions, maintain openness to alternative ways of thinking,
however absurd-seeming.xcix Doing so does not mean granting warrant to everything, but rather
maintaining a sense of perspective. What seems absurd now could be mainstream in the future.
While this sort of complexity and uncertainty may be a bit uncomfortable, I would argue
that it reflects the complicated and uncertain reality of the workings of belief. For better or for
worse, all we have to go on in evaluating belief is what we currently think are the best things to
believe and our reasons for those beliefs. These beliefs and these reasons could one day prove
inadequate, but until we have reason to move past them we should follow our best standards,
because they work best for us now.
The objector may think that I cannot get off this easily. Making standards for warrant
depend on our activities leaves open a harrowing possibility. Imagine, for instance, a completely
delusional community with a whole series of beliefs warranted by their standards. Would we
have to count their beliefs as warranted even though delusional? Take the real cases of the
ancient Greeks, for example: they were wrong about a whole lot of things that they thought they
were right about. Should we say that they were warranted in their beliefs? Most pressingly, we
could be this community. Without discourse-independent standards for warrant, we could be in a
new sort of skeptical scenario where all of our warrant attributions are actually mistakes without
our knowing it. Pragmatism leaves open the possibility of massive error on our part.
This worry is similar to worries about the aforementioned Rortian formulation that
warrant is whatever our contemporaries let us get away with.c One way of objecting to this
formulation is to say that many people’s contemporaries let them get away with patently
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unwarranted beliefs, which is the objection I put forth in the preceding paragraph. But one might
also object slightly differently that many of Rorty’s contemporaries did not let him get away with
that very formulation, though he still thought it warranted. So clearly even the pragmatist accepts
some standard independent of whatever people surrounding him allows. Either way, a discourseindependent standard is necessary.
Responses to this objection have come from one of two places. Some have posited the
existence of external standards for warrant, while others have argued that warrant is just what we
have been trained to think it is. Given my above cursory reasons for rejecting both responses, I
want to follow John McDowell in attempting to navigate a middle way between this Scylla and
Charybdis.ci This middle way has it that any discourse does have a set of standards of warranted
belief independent of our knowledge thereof but that these standards are established by our
language games and discourses.
As mentioned above, McDowell’s argument relies on a generalization of Aristotle’s
notion of phronesis. In this generalization, when one gains the ability to use conceptual
capacities, one becomes initiated into forms of life and their associated traditions, which have
rules and standards that come along with them. To engage in certain forms of life—to use
different types of concepts—is to play by a certain set of rules. If one does not play be the rules
inherent in the forms of life that come with the concepts one is apparently using, then one simply
does not count as using those concepts. In order to engage in any epistemic activity whatsoever,
one must be engaged in some particular activity. Each activity brings with it a set of rules for
how that activity works. Not following these rules merely makes it such that one does not
participate in the activity (running the bases after whiffing at the baseball is some sort of activity,
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but it certainly isn’t baseball). Being epistemically responsible means following the rules
immanent in one’s activity successfully.
In this way of thinking about things, though warrant does depend on our activities for its
existence and for its nature, there is a sense in which one can objectively be held to certain
standards for warrant. However, which standards one is being held to are relative (objectively
relative) to the form of life in which one participates. Forms of life are vaguely delimited and
horizonal, meaning that sometimes what standards one is being held to is not clear. Even so,
most cases are clear, and even unclear cases can be cleared up to some extent by using the
principle of humanity. How specifically this works is only suggested at above and would be
fodder for a more careful examination.
For now, let us stick to examining examples to clarify the point, if not in sufficient detail.
Suppose that rather than challenging Willard’s belief that El Greco painted Las Meninas, Wilfrid
made the same error and counted Willard’s belief as warranted. Let us imagine that Willard is
lecturing Wilfrid on art history, so Wilfrid has reason to trust Willard. We can say that Willard,
the believer, has made a mistake even though Wilfrid, the evaluator, has not caught it. We say so
not because some external standard exists that Willard has violated. Rather, Willard violates the
standard of the discourse of art history in which he is embedded—a man-made entity. Supposing
he actually believes that El Greco painted Las Meninas (and isn’t merely guilty of a slip of the
tongue), he can be said to have been improperly initiated into the practice of art history. At
present Willard and Wilfrid operate with improper standards because, to awkwardly extent the
metaphor, they simply are not playing the game correctly.
In this way, discourses do have standards that do not depend on the specific participants
in the discourse, and thus meet the initial worry. We still have not addressed the skeptical
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scenario, though. Suppose we were in the sort of situation in which Wilfrid and Willard found
themselves with respect to standards of art history with some everyday belief of ours. This
scenario does not worry me as much as it is supposed to. We could be operating with standards
for warrant that ultimately prove unacceptable; in fact, this is likely the situation we are actually
in. It may be the case that the goals we have for certain discourses are simply not being met by
our present ways of engaging in those discourses. Still, we can always improve our standards of
warrant. Though we now scoff at belief in its existence, phlogiston used to be the best means we
had of explaining combustion. However, belief in phlogiston eventually died out because it did
not explain everything that we wanted to explain with a theory of combustion embedded in a
more general chemical theory. It did not explain all of the experimental results that we hoped our
theory of combustion would explain. Our beliefs and our standards for belief evolve in concert
with our interactions with the world.
Perhaps this situation is uncomfortable to some. I suggest that the problem does not fall
out of a weakness of my theory but rather reflects an unfortunate fact about the way our
discourses actually work. We just do not have perfect information about the world, the structure
of our beliefs, or the relationship between our beliefs and the world. The best we can do is to
continue to perfect our ways of thinking about the world by testing them against the lifeworld27
and against other ways of thinking. We move forward in Neurath’s boat because we are out at
sea without any other alternative.

27

“Lifeworld” is a Husserlian concept for the way a world presents itself to us when we engage in a particular form
of life.
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SKEPTICISM AND TRUTH REVISITED
Thus ends my preliminary positive picture of pragmatism about warrant. Because much
of it used terminology and concepts out of the mainstream of analytic epistemology, it may be
worth summarizing before moving on to some implications. The main proposal is this: we can
never take a view from nowhere in analyzing the warrant of a given belief of some believer. To
reflect on warrant attributions we cannot simply evaluate the believer’s noetic architecture in the
neighborhood of the belief in question (whether this architecture be evidential, coherent, or
otherwise); we must also understand how the evaluator models the believer’s noetic architecture,
even if this evaluator is us. Warrant evaluations are always an encounter of epistemic values. The
evaluator of warrant must interpret the reasons that the believer accepted a belief and then
evaluate her interpretation of these reasons.28 These pragmatic readjustments to our
understanding of warrant analysis have definite applications in epistemological practice. I will
examine their implications for addressing external-world skepticism and for the role of truth in
warrant evaluations.
As mentioned above, internalism has long struggled with defending itself against
external-world skepticism (I will drop “external-world” henceforth). Work by Wittgenstein,
Williams, Williamson, and Chalmers (and, in different traditions but strikingly reminiscent,
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze)29, among others, has provided reasons to think that its
defense woes are not merely incomplete arguments but rather betray deep problems with its
28

By “reaons” I do not necessarily mean in the internalist sense. The reason somebody accepts a given belief could
be, for instance, that they have been brainwashed.
29
I will not get into these 20th-century continental reactions to skepticism here, because all of the set-up and
exegesis necessary to do so would distract from the main points. However, for those interested, cf. op. cit. endnote
xii for Heidegger; The Visible and the Invisible, chapter 1 section 1 for Merleau-Ponty; and Difference and
Repetition, chapter 3 for Deleuze. Those familiar with these works should note that all three argue (as I do) that the
traditional epistemological approach to skepticism, and not skepticism itself, is the problem.
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approach. I will argue that the attitude adjustments engendered by pragmatism about warrant do
much to alleviate skeptical worries.
We have seen that the Cartesian skeptic succeeds so well against the foundationalist
merely by attacking the validity of foundational beliefs. But if one takes a step back from
foundationalist orthodoxy, one realizes that the existence of foundational beliefs is a theoretical
commitment peculiar to foundationalism. One must believe that a certain subset of beliefs
supports every other belief in order to think that potentials defeaters for these beliefs are
potential defeaters for an individual’s entire set of beliefs.cii A related objection dooms
coherentism. If the skeptic proposes that our beliefs, however coherent, may have nothing to do
with reality, the coherentist must be worried specifically because her standards for warrant are
internal and global. The worry is that even the coherentist’s highest means of warrant granting
would fail.ciii
Skepticism also attacks another weakness of internalist epistemology. If one believes that
some possible fact about the world (e.g. that I am a brain in a vat) can elicit doubt about
everything that she believes, then the skeptic has already won. Let us assume that the skeptic is
right in saying that a skeptical belief can have nothing count against it, for that is how the skeptic
has formulated it and that is what causes the anxiety in the traditional epistemologist. But what
the internalist overlooks is that a skeptical belief also can have nothing count for it for the very
same reasons. If we think that the only reasons we have for holding a belief are internal, then two
beliefs that are internally equivalent are separated by a distinction without a difference.30 There
is, then, no way to evaluate a skeptical claim, and when the traditional epistemologist takes for
granted that there is, she concedes to the skeptic in advance.
30

Williamson argues that the skeptic (and the internalist in being threatened by the skeptic) assumes a
phenomenalist version of evidence without argument. He then provides an alternative account of evidence that he
thinks more plausible (Cf. chapter 8).
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When we step back from internalism and its peculiar epistemological commitments, we
see that in providing scenarios that are supposed to invoke skepticism, the skeptic has only
succeeded in putting forth alternative metaphysical theories about the ultimate nature of reality.
Perhaps, the skeptic proposes, reality is just a series of stimulations to my brain, which is in a vat
somewhere. Fortunately, we do not normally take such theories to invalidate all of our beliefs at
once. Metaphysicians propose new theories all the time without changing very many of their
other beliefs. This is because we simply do not have the option of rejecting our entire set of
beliefs in light of a new possibility (that, for instance, I am and always have been a brain in a
vat), as a skeptical argument might suggest. It would be impossible to judge the warrant of the
new possibility without any beliefs, for then we would be unable to determine what a reason to
believe would be. We need a form of life with which to evaluate the new possibility. This
epistemological idea is parallel to Quine's linguistic/ontological concept of a background
language/theory. Our set of beliefs, our background theory, gives a new idea sense, because ideas
can only have sense relative to our background theory. If there were no background theory by
which to make sense of a novel belief, there would be no way of making sense of a novel belief.
So we cannot drop all of our beliefs in favor of a new one.civ
But perhaps it seems that we do not need any special epistemological commitments to be
taken in by skepticism.cv Anthony Rudd, for instance, points to the musings of a teenager
untrained in philosophy to show that radical skepticism is far from a technical problem unique to
professional philosophers.cvi But how one interprets such musings depends on one’s
epistemological commitments, even if the musings themselves may not. I would argue that such
admittedly natural reflection on the nature of reality (to which I myself was prone as a teenager
untrained in philosophy) is just that—ontological speculation—rather than doubt about the
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warrant of all of one’s beliefs. The interpretation of such reflection as a serious epistemological
problem, not the reflection itself, is the uniquely philosophical problem. A further argument, and
along with it some epistemological commitments, would be needed to turn innocent reflection
into the worrying doubts of skepticism.
Hence, when presented with the possible belief that I could be a brain in a vat, I could
accept it without rejecting all of my other beliefs. I would have to modify some of my beliefs
about the underlying metaphysical nature of reality, but that would not affect the belief that, for
instance, I had lunch at 12:30pm today.31 Almost everything that we think about the world
should still apply except for our belief about what makes the world that way. As William James
has argued, “our knowledge grows in spots”, not as a whole.cvii Currently, we turn to physics for
our belief that the underlying structure of reality is stated by some version of quantum
mechanics, but if some discovery arose to lead us to think that the underlying structure of the
world is actually a very powerful mind or computer program32 we would simply modify our
beliefs about the underlying structure of the world. We would not, however, completely change
the way we think about the world in every context. Belief in quantum mechanics has not made
us change our belief that a table has legs, so why should the belief in a brain-in-a-vat ontology
such as a computational structure of the world be any different?cviii
Whereas the internalist had problems with external-world skepticism, the externalist had
problems basing normative principles on truth. Externalism went forth proposing qualities all
warrant-producing faculties had in common without asking the prior question of why we think

31

It might affect what it means to have lunch at 12:30, because we analyze having lunch as really just an
epiphenomenon of…but that does not mean that it changes the fact that I did have lunch today at 12:30, as long as
my original belief was correct.
32
Both of these hypotheses have actually been proposed as metaphysical theories: the former by the German
Idealists and the latter by Nick Bostrom, “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?” Philosophical Quarterly 53
(2003) 243-255.
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these faculties produce warranted beliefs. It seemed obvious that we should choose the faculties
that produce true beliefs. This seemed a normative judgment hardly worth mentioning.33 One
problem, though, is that we are still in the process of figuring out what is true.34 So, whereas
externalism seems to work quite well for faculties that produce beliefs that we all agree are true
(if only because we all agree), it fails to say much beyond these obvious cases. Perhaps more
importantly, it fails to tell us what it is about these beliefs that make us think that they’re all true.
I have briefly argued that this failure merely leads the externalist to point to beliefs that the
externalist values as true rather than using some principled criterion for selecting true beliefs.
Plantinga and Goldman, for instance, value many overlapping beliefs, but certainly not all, as in
the case of belief in God, and, not coincidentally, their different theories reflect their different
values. Stephen Stich has argued more extensively that once we look at the details we find that
all it is to call a belief true is to point at beliefs one has been acculturated to value.cix This will
certainly not do.
Perhaps Ernest Sosa can be seen to have a better alternative. His virtue epistemology
bears many similarities to Plantinga’s proper functionalism, while acknowledging that warrant
attributions are normatively governed behaviors. He proposes to evaluate belief-formation just
like any other activity, by appealing to what we value in the exhibition of that activity. What we
value is aptness. A skill is performed aptly if it succeeds because of the adroitness of the
performer. In the doxastic case, we value a belief that is true (i.e. successful) and gained through

33

Externalists are certainly not alone in using this technique. My objections are focused on my treatment of the
externalist’s picture, but they have relevance to all epistemologists who base evaluative epistemic judgments on
truth.
34
Plantinga takes the Cartesian tack of positing a benevolent God who allows us to have true belief. This is his
guarantee that our faculties are in a congenial cognitive environment. An atheist or agnostic will find this
methodology unacceptable, and I think that this means that we have no such guarantee. I agree with Stephen Stich
(op. cit.) that we should not be too concerned that our beliefs are not guaranteed to be true, for both the reasons he
offers and reasons I point to elsewhere in this essay.
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some competence of the believer. That is, we value cases where a believer has discovered the
truth of a belief through the proper means (means that we value as proper).cx One might think of
Sosa as stating that we value beliefs acquired through a properly functioning faculty with the
addendum that what counts as proper function depends on what we consider virtuous epistemic
behavior.
This sort of virtue epistemology only goes part of the way, though. We are still left with a
hand wave about truth. To the question of what we should believe and why, Sosa would
presumably respond “apt beliefs, because they are true and gained virtuously”. But what about
cases where we don’t know if our belief is true or if the very truth of the belief is in question?
Worse, it seems that at least sometimes we establish the truth of a belief by appealing to its
virtuous discovery. Sosa might say that in cases like this we can just appeal to adroitness, which
is aptness minus truth/success. He notes that adroitness should be seen as having fundamental
epistemic worth apart from and alongside truth.cxi But if this is the case, why point to truth at all?
If we take Stich’s and my arguments seriously, then to say we value true belief is to say that we
value beliefs that we value. To say that we value apt belief is to say that we value beliefs that we
value gained through means that we value. This analysis is not very helpful unless we understand
how we determine which beliefs we value and why. That is exactly what I have tried to do in my
positive account above.
If I am right, then we need not understand warrant as connected with truth and its
difficulties. To understand the workings of warrant-attribution we need only understand how
people go about evaluating each other’s beliefs. This involves knowing what people’s goals are
for those beliefs, so an externalist might defend herself by saying that many people hope that
their beliefs are true. To say that people want their beliefs to be true, though, is a vague
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pronouncement. People may indeed value truth in evaluating each other’s beliefs, but if we are to
understand what a given person values when she seems to value truth we need to be very careful
to take into account the differences across cultures and individuals concerning these values.
Different people call different things true. This adjustment does not force us to believe, along
with Dewey, that truth is just warranted assertion. Rather, it frees us to investigate warranted
assertion without worrying about whether or not truth is at issue.
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CONCLUSION
In order to highlight various implications of adopting a pragmatist account of warrant, I
have generally favored breadth over depth. Some of this I supplemented by referring the reader
to other work, but this is hardly satisfactory. After all, not all of the works referred to agree with
each other—some even propound contradictory positions. Though drawing with such broad
strokes does have such shortcomings, I think that the outline of a theory that I have sketched
provides ample space for filling in and some guidance for how to go about it. Given the content
of the pragmatist theory—the fact that it focuses on actual practices, cultural differences,
language use, etc.—there are two general sorts of filling in that can be done. Armchair debate
about the details of the conceptual framework would be helpful for parts of the picture. This
approach would do well in specifying the role of occurrent beliefs, for instance, or in getting into
more detail about the nature of truth and how different positions on its nature could affect the
role it plays in justification and warrant attributions. I have hinted at my own positions on these
issues and others, but much more philosophical work would need to be done to generate models
that would be satisfactorily detailed. My outline also leaves room for filling in through empirical
investigation. We could answer such questions as “how good are we at knowing what another
person believes?”, “how do we establish some statements/beliefs as acceptable?”, “are there
cultural differences in what beliefs a given perceptual experience generates?” through
experimentation. All three of these questions have been addressed to some extent in the
literature: psychological work on theory of mind relates to the first, psycholinguistic work on
using language in order to accomplish an activity has given some insight into the second,cxii and
work on perception in cultural psychology points to a “yes” answer to the third.cxiii Many more
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such questions could be generated and answered by operationalizing aspects of the pragmatist
theory of warrant I have proposed and putting them to the experimental test.
Recall once again that in inquiring into the nature of warrant, I have been using the
question of what it takes for something to count as good to believe. The fact that, for a
pragmatist, empirical results can bear on the answer to this question indicates something crucial
about pragmatism about warrant. According to pragmatism (I will leave out “about warrant” for
the remainder of the discussion), figuring out what it takes for a belief to be warranted is not a
matter of mere conceptual analysis. We cannot simply assume that there is one correct parsing of
warrant and/or justification; we must see how people actually go about justifying and judging the
warrant of beliefs. In order to figure out what warrant means, pragmatism moves away from
analyzing the concept of warrant and towards investigating the use of the concept. This might
mean actually researching how people judge the worth of one belief versus another or how we
can manipulate these judgments. It also means that we should not be alarmed when we find
different people using different standards of warrant or the same person using different standards
of warrant in different situations. This simply might be how belief evaluation works.
On the other hand, I think that the analyses of warrant that I spent the first part of this
essay arguing against provide many useful insights on how we actually go about justifying and
establishing the warrant of our beliefs. Like Earl Conee, I believe that the foundationalist, the
coherentist, the externalist, and the internalist all have something to bring to the table in figuring
out what is involved in our epistemic norms.cxiv Each theory has its own intuitive appeal, and for
good reason. After all, what these philosophers have generally been considering in performing
their conceptual analyses is their own usage of the concepts of warrant and justification. What
they have done, then, is to mine in some detail their own norms for a range of cases. They have

Herrine 82
provided pro tanto criteria for several of our epistemic practices. If we understand these criteria
as part of a pluralist list of standards rather than as analyses of universal standards, then they can
be quite useful. For instance, externalism has been and can still be important in understanding
how immediate justification works (or, to put it another way, how basic beliefs gain their
warrant). Much key work has been done by externalists to separate out basic beliefs from nonbasic beliefs, to move the focus away from reasons towards norms, and to point out what sort of
cognitive processes we value. Sosa’s virtue epistemology has moved this process forward by
highlighting more strongly these evaluation’s connections to our normative practices.
There are many more important analyses to be found in these more conventional forms of
epistemology. Pragmatism does not turn its nose at these issues, but rather reframes their
relevance. If what I have had to say in this essay is correct, then we cannot merely take the
analyses such as that of the externalist at face value. We have to ask, for instance, if what we
currently count as properly functioning cognitive faculties should be considered properly
functioning all things considered. And we should be open to the fact that our standards for proper
function may change or evolve, because the way we conceptualize reality and our goals for a
given discourse may change or evolve. We should also be open to others’ standards and the
possibility that they—not we—have better ones. The results of externalism are tools that the
epistemologist can wield in examining certain aspects of belief evaluation. They can be used
together with the tools provided by examining coherence relations and exploring the nature of
evidence. We might even be able to classify different discourses according to how much they
stress each of these epistemic values, for instance. Possibilities abound.
In all these details, my guiding question may have gotten lost, so let me ask it one more
time. What is it for a belief to have warrant? To answer in short may not be helpful, but
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hopefully the preceding will contextualize my response. For a belief to have warrant it must fit
the standards of the context in which it was offered. How these standards and contexts work is
complicated, but the foregoing has provided some preliminary thoughts on them. Most
importantly, I hope to have driven home the point that what makes a belief warranted depends on
a relationship between the warrant evaluator and the believer rather than on objective facts about
the believer. Does my view help us decide which beliefs to accept? Perhaps. My vague
recommendation is that we accept those beliefs that seem the best based on our current standards.
Though this does not say much, it does imply that we can be warranted now even though
ultimately mistaken and that we should not assume that our current standards for warrant (no
matter how precise or well-worked-out) are the only or the best. However, a more detailed
prescriptive picture will have to be saved for another discussion.
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